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Abstract
This paper provides a framework to analyse emergency liquidity assis-
tance of central banks on financial markets in response to aggregate and
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. The model combines the microeconomic
view of liquidity as the ability to sell assets quickly and at low costs and the
macroeconomic view of liquidity as a medium of exchange that influences
the aggregate price level of goods. The central bank faces a trade-off be-
tween limiting the negative output effects of dramatic asset price declines
and more inflation. Furthermore, the anticipation of central bank inter-
vention causes a moral hazard effect with investors. This gives rise to the
possibility of an optimal monetary policy under commitment.
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1 Introduction
Liquidity is an important concept in finance and macroeconomics. The micro-
economic literature in finance views liquidity roughly as the ability to sell as-
sets quickly and costlessly. In macroeconomics, liquidity refers to a generally
accepted medium of exchange or, in brief, money. Money is the most liquid
asset due to the fact that it does not need to be converted into anything else
in order to make purchases of real goods or other assets. This feature makes
money valuable in both perspectives.
This paper uses this common perspective of money and links liquidity risk
on an asset market with aggregate demand and aggregate supply on a goods
market. Spillover effects from the asset market to the goods market can justify
a central bank intervention on the asset market even if the central bank does
not take the welfare of investors on the asset market into account. Hence, the
model provides a framework to analyse the perceived insurance against severe
financial turmoil by the Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan, which has
been termed the ‘Greenspan put’ in the popular press and ‘liquidity provision
principle’ by Taylor (2005).
Liquidity provision has been studied in the literature with a focus on the role of
financial intermediaries (see, e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Allen and Gale,
1998; Diamond and Rajan, 2001, 2005; Goodhart and Illing, 2002). Considerably
less research looked at liquidity provision by financial markets (see, e.g., Allen
and Gale, 1994; Holmström and Tirole, 1998). Furthermore, all of these papers
use models with real assets and claims. If the aim is to analyse optimal mon-
etary interventions on financial markets, however, it seems to be natural that
one has to use a model in nominal units, since the central bank can provide
nominal fiat money but not real goods. Only recently, Gale (2005) and Dia-
mond and Rajan (2006) have made first steps in that direction and developed
models with nominal assets.1 Contributing to this literature, I develop an ana-
lytical framework based on the cash-in-the-market pricing model of Allen and
Gale (1994, 2005) that directly links monetary policy and liquidity on financial
markets.
Before I turn to the details of the model, the following two sections provide
empirical and historical evidence of the role of liquidity on asset prices and in
financial crises.
1Allen and Gale (1998) contains discussions about both monetary policy to limit some ineffi-
ciencies of bank runs and the effects of an asset market. Gale (2005, p. 2) himself, however, argues
that this and more recent papers by Allen and Gale that use the same methodology are ‘essentially
real (non-monetary) models’ and ‘focus on banks and banking, to the exclusion of other parts of
the financial system.’
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1.1 Empirical evidence for the role of liquidity on asset prices
One of the first studies that empirically links asset pricing and liquidity is Ami-
hud and Mendelson (1986), who show that shares’ excess returns increase in
the size of the average bid-ask spread, a well-known measure of an asset’s
level of liquidity. Recent research has provided further important empirical ev-
idence on the relevance of time-varying market-wide liquidity on asset pricing
and of the effects of monetary expansions on liquidity during crisis periods.
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)measuremarket liquidity as the equallyweighted
average of individual shares’ expected return reversal. The authors start from
the idea that a sell (buy) order should be accompanied by a negative (posi-
tive) price impact that one expects to be partially reversed in the future if the
share is not perfectly liquid. Sharp declines in this measure coincide with mar-
ket declines and ‘flight to quality’ or ‘flight to liquidity’ episodes in which in-
vestors want to shift from relatively illiquid medium to long-term assets such
as shares into safe and liquid government bonds or cash. Examples of such
incidents are discussed in the following section 1.2. Market-wide liquidity as
measured by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) appears to be a state variable that is
important for share prices. Shares whose returns are more sensitive to aggre-
gate liquidity have substantially higher expected returns, even as the authors
control for exposures to the market, size and value factors of Fama and French
(1993) and a momentum factor.
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) derive and estimate a liquidity-adjusted capital
asset pricing model. In addition to the standard market beta, their model has
three betas representing different forms of liquidity risk. One beta resembles
the analysis in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003): Investors are willing to accept a
lower expected return on an asset with a high return in times of market illiq-
uidity. Futhermore, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) show that investors require a
higher expected return for a security that becomes illiquid when the market in
general becomes illiquid. Finally, investors require a lower expected return for
an asset that is liquid if the market return is low. In the authors’ estimations,
the last effect appears to have the strongest impact on expected returns.
Most importantly for this paper, Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005)
establish an empirical link between the macro- and the micro-perspective of
liquidity. The authors find that ‘money flows (...) account for part of the com-
monality in stock and bond market liquidity.’ Furthermore, they use vector
autoregressions to provide evidence that a loose monetary policy, measured as
a decrease in net borrowed reserves or a negative interest rate surprise,2 is as-
2Net borrowed reserves represent the difference between the amount of reserves banks need to
have to satisfy their reserve requirements and the amount which the Fed is willing to supply. A
negative interest rate surprise is defined as a drop of the federal funds target rate below market
2
sociated with lower bid-ask spreads, i.e. increased liquidity, in times of crises.
1.2 Historical liquidity crises and central banks’ reactions
Besides these empirical studies, there is also a lot of anecdotal evidence how
central banks reacted to liquidity crises, since the last decades have shown a
number of such crises on financial markets. For example, Davis (1994) de-
scribes five severe liquidity crises in international markets: The Penn Central
Bankruptcy in 1970, the crisis in the floating-rate notes market in the UK in
1986, the failure of the US-High Yield bond market in 1989, the Swedish Com-
mercial Paper crisis in 1990 and the collapse of the ECU bond market in 1992.
Greenspan (2004) highlights three crises during his chairmanship at the Fed-
eral Reserve (Fed), in which market participants wanted to convert illiquid
medium to long-term assets into cash because they favoured safety and liquid-
ity over uncertainty: The stock market crash in 1987, the LTCM-crisis 1998 and
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This section provides a brief review
of these three events and the central banks’, in particular the Fed’s, reactions to
them. Sauer (2007) contains a more detailed discussion of the events.
On 19 October 1987 (‘Black Monday’), the Dow Jonex Index dropped by 22.6%.
Many commentators blamed institutional investors that followed a portfolio
insurance investment strategy for the dramatic crash in prices.3 Similar to stop-
loss-orders, portfolio insurance implies automatic sell orders when the value
of a portfolio or single shares falls below a certain threshold. If the absorption
capacity of the market is limited, portfolio insurance can cause a vicious circle
of price falls and further sell orders (see also section 4.3).
Grossman and Miller (1988) describe the events on 19 and 20 October against
the background of their model in which market liquidity is determined by the
demand and supply of immediacy, i.e. the willingness to trade immediately
rather than to wait some time for a possibly better price. They argue that order
imbalances were so great4 that market makers became incapable of supplying
further immediacy. Market illiquidity materialised as delays in the execution
and confirmation of trades and as the virtual impossibility of executing market
sell orders at the quoted prices at the time of order entry.
As chairman of the Fed, Alan Greenspan managed to improve the confidence
of investors and the liquidity of the market by issuing the following statement
expectations (Chordia et al., 2005, pp. 112-113).
3For example, Gammill and Marsh (1988) report official statistics that show that institutional
investors who followed a portfolio insurance investment strategy were the heaviest net sellers on
the New York Stock Exchange and in the S&P 500 index futures market.
4After a more than 10% decline of the Dow Jones between Wednesday, 14 October, and Fri-
day, 16 October, Gammill and Marsh (1988) note an ‘overhang of incomplete portfolio selling’ by
portfolio insurers which caused additional selling pressure on the morning of Black Monday.
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at 9am on 20 October 1987:
The Federal Reserve, consistent with its responsibilities as the Na-
tion’s central bank, affirmed today its readiness to serve as a source
of liquidity to support the economic and financial system (Greenspan,
1987).
The Dow Jones regained 5.9% and 10.1% on this and the following day, re-
spectively. Garcia (1989) discusses the different tools the Fed used to limit the
extent of the stock market crash. These included, besides communication via
the quoted statement, mainly open market operations and the use of the dis-
count window to provide liquidity in the form of additional money to the mar-
ket. The handling of the crisis by Alan Greenspan, who was appointed as Fed
Chairman only two months earlier, laid the foundations for the belief in an
insurance against stock market losses, the alleged ‘Greenspan put’ (see also
section 5.1).
In September 1998, the near-collapse of the hedge fund Long-term Capital
Management (LTCM) caused severe turmoil on financial markets.5 After years
of extraodinary performance, LTCMexperienced below-average returns in 1997
and even losses in the first half of 1998. In response, LTCM increased its lever-
age, i.e. its debt/equity ratio, and focused even more on investments in rel-
atively illiquid assets. The Russian default in August 1998 caused a flight to
quality into liquid government bonds, while the prices of more illiquid assets
fell dramatically. Margin calls forced LTCM to sell its assets into the falling
market, which exacerbated the crisis. Other market participants could not (and
some did not want to, see Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005) step in and buy
assets, not least because they had copied LTCM’s trading strategies and were
constrained in their available funds. LTCM’s supposedly sophisticated risk
management system had not taken this endogeneity of risk sufficiently into
account and its imminent collapse threatened the functioning of the Treasury
bond market because of LTCM’s large short-positions on this market.
On 23 September, the New York Fed organised a private bailout of LTCM by
14 banks that had lent to the fund. In the following weeks, the Fed lowered its
policy rate three times by 25 basis points in order to provide sufficient liquidity
for financial markets. Both Greenspan (2004) andMeyer (2004), whowas on the
Fed’s Board of Governors at that time, admit that the purpose of these rate cuts
was to calm financial markets rather than to stimulate the still expanding real
economy. Indeed, the second cut boosted financial markets6 and, for example,
5For a more detailed analysis of the LTCM-crisis, see e.g. IMF (1998), Jorion (2000) or Sauer
(2002).
6The cut was implemented between two scheduled meetings of the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee on 15 October 1998, a very rare step by the Fed under Alan Greenspan.
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considerably lowered spreads on repos, swaps, corporate bonds and off-the-
run treasuries, which all had increased dramatically after the Russian default
(IMF, 1998, p. 39). Nevertheless, the Fed still feared the downside risks and
lowered its policy rate a third time on 17 November despite lingering positive
GDP data. Given the subsequent rise in inflation and equity prices until 2000,
Meyer (2004, p. 121) later regretted this last cut.
The terrorist attacks in the morning of 11 September 2001 represented a very
different form of a liquidity shock to financial markets. Liquidity evaporated
from the financial system not because ofmargin calls, portfolio insurance strate-
gies or a preference shock, but rather because large parts of the communication
system and a lot of back offices in lower Manhattan were physically destroyed.
One immediate response of the authorities was to leave the New York Stock
Exchange, the American Stock Exchange and NASDAQ closed until 17 Sep-
tember. Hence, liquidity problems concentrated in the payment and settle-
ment system and did not affect the stock market immediately. In that sense,
the effects were limited and the Fed could quickly withdraw the additional 108
billion US-$ in discount window credits, overnight repos and check floats it
had supplied to banks until 13 September already by 20 September (Lacker,
2004, table 1).
In Europe, the European Central Bank (ECB) immediately issued the following
press statement on 11 September:
After the unprecedented and tragic events in the United States today,
the Eurosystem stands ready to support the normal functioning of
the markets. In particular, the Eurosystem will provide liquidity to
the markets, if need be. (ECB, 2001a)
Furthermore, the ECB conducted two one-day fine-tuning operations on 12
and 13 September with a volume of 69.3 and 40.5 billion Euro, respectively,
in which all bids were satisfied. It also entered into a swap agreement with
the Fed over 50 billion US-$ to provide dollar liquidity to European banks on
12 September (ECB, 2001b). However, the ECB left its key interest rates un-
changed on its regular meeting on 13 September.
Just before U.S. stock markets reopened on the morning of Monday 17 Sep-
tember, the Fed cut its target rate by 50 basis points. The ECB followed suit
and also lowered its key interest rates by the same amount. The Fed contin-
ued to cut rates on 2 October, 6 November and 11 December, while the ECB re-
duced its rates only on 9 November. Although Lacker (2004, p. 961) argues that
‘the [Fed] interest rate cuts following September 11 are probably best viewed
as addressing the medium- and longer-term macroeconomic consequences’
rather than a necessary response to disruptions in the payment system, the
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contemporaneous action of central banks worldwide on 17 September7 hints
that this move was also aimed at rebuilding confidence and signalling that
central banks would continue to provide liquidity if necessary. Indeed, on 17
September the Dow Jones opened only 3.2% below the closing value on 10
September. Until 21 September, the Dow lost 14.3% compared to 10 September,
but regained quickly in the following weeks and reached the pre-terrorist level
already in October.
A common feature of these crises is that the Fed lowered its interest rate to
provide emergency liquidity to the market, although the mandate of the Fed
in the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978 focuses on price stability and full em-
ployment. Taylor (1993) suggested a simple interest rate rule to capture these
two goals:
it = r
∗
t + pit + 0.5(pit − pi
∗
t ) + 0.5yt. (1)
The nominal interest rate it should rise with the natural real rate r∗t , inflation pit
relative to its target rate pi∗t and the output gap yt. The comparison of the actual
Fed funds target rate with the recommendation from this Taylor rule provides
a simple test for the liquidity provision principle, i.e. a temporary departure
of interest rates from the Taylor rule during financial crises (Taylor, 2005) in
order to avoid negative spillover effects from the asset to the goods market.
Figure 1 shows that the Fed decreased its policy rate in the months following
all three crises as noted above. The Taylor rule, however, recommended a rise
of the interest rate after the crises of 1987 and 1998. Therefore, monetary policy
appears expansionary for about six months until April 1988 and even more so
after the LTCM-crisis 1998. In contrast, the Taylor rate matches the actual Fed
funds rate after the terrorist attacks in 2001 quite closely. From the beginning
of 2002, actual monetary policy looks even restrictive compared to the Taylor
rule.
Figure 2 reveals considerable differences in the development of inflation in the
aftermath of the crises. For comparison, inflation is measured as the annual
growth rate of both the consumer price index (CPI) and the personal consump-
tion expenditure index (PCE), but the differences appear to be negligible. The
average inflation rate one and a half to two years after the crises compared to
average inflation in the six months up to the crises increased by 0.8 percentage
points after 1987 and 1.7 points after 1998.8 In contrast, inflation decreased by
0.4 (PCE) or 0.9 (CPI) points after 2001. Therefore, expansionary monetary pol-
icy via the liquidity provision principle appears to have contributed to price
7Besides the Fed and the ECB, also the Bank of England, the Swedish Riksbank, the Bank of
Canada and other central banks worldwide lowered their policy rates on the same day.
8Besides the rise in consumer prices, expansionary monetary policy may also have contributed
to the boom and bust period of equity prices in the five years following the LTCM-crisis.
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Figure 1: Federal funds target rate (solid line) and Taylor rule rate (dashed line) in the
U.S. during the crises in 1987, 1998 and 2001.
Notes: The Taylor rule rate is based on equation (1) with pit measured as the annual growth rate
of the consumer price index and yt measured as the quarterly OECD-output gap transformed
into monthly data with a cubic spline. The Taylor rate is adjusted for time-varying r∗t and pi
∗
t by
matching the average Taylor rate in the six months prior to the respective crisis with the average
Federal funds target rate over this period. Data source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
Figure 2: CPI (solid line) and PCE (dashed line) inflation rates in the U.S. after the
crises in 1987, 1998 and 2001.
Notes: Inflation is measured as the annual growth rate of the consumer price index (CPI) and the
personal consumption expenditure index (PCE). Data source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
increases after 1987 and 1998, while a normal or even restrictive stance of mon-
etary policy added to a decline of inflation after 2001.
All three historical episodes of liquidity crises demonstrate that central banks,
and in particular the Fed under Alan Greenspan, stood ready to provide liq-
uidity in times of financial crises. Greenspan (2004, p. 38) states that the ‘im-
mediate response on the part of the central bank to such financial implosions
must be to inject large quantities of liquidity,’ in line with the traditional Bage-
hot (1873) principle for a lender of last resort activity to ‘lend freely at a high
rate against good collateral.’ But the events also indicate that not all financial
crises are alike and central banks face a difficult task to decide on the optimal
policy, which depends on the associated cost and benefits. The rest of this pa-
per develops a stylised model of an asset market and a goods market which
provides a framework to analyse the relevant trade-offs for the central bank.
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1.3 The model in a nutshell
The model consists of two separate markets, an asset market and a goods mar-
ket. The main focus is on developments on the asset market, but these de-
velopments have important implications for the goods market. Although the
monetary authority only cares about deviations of goods prices and quantities
from the optimal values, the spillover effects from the asset market may require
a central bank intervention on this market.
In the model, investors can invest on an asset market in liquid money and
potentially illiquid, but productive assets, called shares, in order to optimally
satisfy their uncertain consumption needs on the goods market over two peri-
ods. Two channels link the goods market to the asset market: First, the amount
of money held by investors determines together with the size of a liquidity
shock the aggregate demand of investors on the goods market which is subject
to a cash-in-advance constraint. Second, a dramatic decrease of the asset price
negatively influences the goods supply in the final period because it forces in-
vestors to costly liquidate their asset. Hence, the central bank faces a trade-off
between inflating a demand shock today, which causes higher losses today, and
limiting a negative supply shock tomorrow, which will cause higher losses to-
morrow. Expectations of central bank intervention give rise to a moral hazard
effect with additional investment in less liquid, but productive shares. If the
central bank has the possibility to commit to some future policy, it should opti-
mally weight these productivity gains against the expected intervention costs.
Section 2 analyses the basic model under certainty and aggregate risk. Section
3 provides further insights into the trade-off the central bank faces and derives
the optimal central bank intervention before section 4 discusses the impact of
idiosyncratic risk. After the discussion of the related literature in section 5,
section 6 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Framework
A continuum of ex ante identical investors i is uniformally distributed on an
intervall I = [0; 1]. They can invest on an asset market and buy goods for
consumption on a separate goods market. An investor i derives utility from
consumption ct in periods t = 1, 2 according to the utility function
Ui(c1, c2) = γζi ln c1 + β ln c2. (2)
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Table 1: Payoffs of money and shares in t = 0, 1, 2.
0 1 2
m = w − s −1
{
1 0
0 1
s −1

q 0
0 R
ρ 0
γζi represents a liquidity shock that consists of an aggregate liquidity shock γ
and an individual liquidity shock ζi. The distribution functions of both shocks
are assumed to be uncorrelated, symmetric, having a positive support and an
expected value of 1 in t = 0, i.e. E0 [γζi] =
∫∞
−∞ γf(γ)dγ ·
∫∞
−∞ ζif(ζi)dζi = 1.
Every investor is endowed with nominal wealthw that can be invested in t = 0
in nominal moneym and a real asset s, called shares, on a primary market with
price q0 = 1 fixed and s endogenous. The asset pays a fixed nominal return R
in t = 2 and can be traded at the nominal price q on a secondary asset market in
t = 1 after the realisation of the liquidity shock γζi, but before goods are traded
on the goods market. Besides, investors have access to a costly real liquidation
technique, which transforms z units of the asset s into ρz units of additional
consumption goods in period 1 with ρ < 1. The individual cost of liquidation
is the missed nominal return Rz in t = 2 and the social cost is a reduction of
aggregate supply in t = 2 by ∆(z).9 The asset s can also be interpreted as a
nominal bond with a fixed interest rate R and a real put option with a strike
price of ρ. Table 1 summarises the payoffs ofm and s in t = 0, 1, 2.
At the beginning of t = 1 and 2, homogenous, infinitely divisible and non-
storable consumption goods are produced with capital and labour input from
workers who can participate only on the goods market and receive a nominal
wage ψt that is determined at t−1.10 These goods must be bought by investors
and workers with money, i.e. they are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint.
The price of consumption goods pt is determined by demand for goods from
workers and investors and the aggregate supply of goods. Markets are com-
9For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Allen and Gale (1998) contain a discussion of the
costs of premature liquidation of assets. The costly liquidation technology shall represent investors
possibility to a) partly liquidate their capital, b) sell their capital to less productive owners or c)
cut down replacement investments because firms’ refinancing possibilities depend on their share
price as in the financial accelerator model by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). In this model,
the assumption ρ < 1 guarantees that money is not fully dominated by the asset given the price
determination on the goods market as explained in section 2.2.2 and the absence of central bank
interventions. For the corresponding condition with central bank intervention, see Corollary 2 on
page 29.
10Section 5.2 discusses the literature on market segmentation.
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Figure 3: Time structure of the model.
petitive but incomplete. Figure 3 summarises the timing of the model.
2.2 Under Certainty
2.2.1 Investors’ problem and asset market
Before I analyse the effects of liquidity shocks γζi, I solve the model under
certainty, i.e. γ = ζi = 1. The individual investor maximises her utility function
(2) subject to her budget constraint and her cash-in-advance constraint (CIA) in
t = 1.11 She controls her initial investment in the asset s, her consumption ct in
t = 1 and 2 bought on the goods market with cash, her demand for additional
assets in t = 1, sˆ, and the extent of costly liquidation z, which is subject to a
non-negativity constraint:12
max
s,c1,c2,sˆ,z
U(c′1, c2) = ln (c1 + ρz) + β ln c2 s.t. (3)
p1c1 + p2c2 ≤ w − s+Rs+ (R− q)sˆ−Rz
p1c1 + qsˆ ≤ w − s
0 ≤ z ≤ s
11The budget constraint implicitly includes the CIA for t = 2 as the investor holds only cash
when she enters the goods market in t = 2.
12The Cobb-Douglas utility function (2) makes ct > 0 as long as w > 0.
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Note that an investors’ total consumption in t = 1, c′1, is the sum of the con-
sumption purchased via the goods market, c1, and the real return from the
possible liquidation of assets, ρz. Solving the maximisation problem with the
Lagrangian
max
s,c1,c2,sˆ,z
Λ = ln (c1 + ρz) + β ln c2
− λ [p1c1 + p2c2 − (w − s)−Rs− (R− q)sˆ]
− µ [p1c1 + qsˆ− (w − s)]
yields as first-order conditions
dΛ
dc1
=
1
c1 + ρz
− λp1 − µp1 = 0 −→ µ+ λ =
1
p1 (c1 + ρz)
(4a)
dΛ
dc2
=
β
c2
− λp2 = 0 −→ λ =
β
p2c2
(4b)
dΛ
ds
= −λ+ λR− µ = 0 −→ µ = λ (R− 1) (4c)
dΛ
dsˆ
= λ (R− q)− µq = 0 −→ µ = λ
(
R
q
− 1
)
(4d)
dΛ
dz
=
1
c1 + ρz
ρ− λR ≤ 0 (4e)
dΛ
dλ
= −p1c1 − p2c2 + (w − s) +Rs+(R− q)sˆ ≥ 0 (4f)
dΛ
dµ
= −p1c1 − qsˆ+ (w − s) ≥ 0 (4g)
and dL
dz
z = 0, dL
dλ
λ = 0 and dL
dµ
µ = 0 as complementary slackness conditions.13
Since the costly liquidation is inefficient for p1ρ < 1, investors will not use
it under certainty, and z = 0.14 As will become clear from the discussion of
the goods market in the next section, the price of goods p1 equals its expected
value, i.e. p1 = 1, under certainty, so ρ < 1 is a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for z = 0.
(4c) and (4d) show that q = 1 in the equilibrium under certainty because hold-
ing money would be dominated from t = 0 to t = 1 for q > 1 and s = w, while
holding shares would be dominated from t = 0 to t = 1 for q < 1 and s = 0.
For q = 1, money and shares are equivalent assets from t = 0 to t = 1. Since
money is dominated by shares over the long run, the CIA is binding in t = 1.15
13The second-order conditions for amaximum are fulfilled, since (3) maximises a strictly concave
utility function under linear constraints and the optimum is an interior solution.
14By plugging µ from (4c) in (4a), solving for λ and then plugging λ in the inequality (4e), it can
be shown that dΛ/dz is negative and thus z = 0 as long as p1ρ < 1.
15Since R > 1 by assumption and λ > 0 from (4b), the FOC for optimal investment in s yields
µ > 0.
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The only possible symmetric equilibrium is sˆ = 0 , i.e. there is no trade on the
asset market in t = 1, and money is only held for consumption in t = 1: (4g)
reduces to p1c1 = w− s. The combination of (4a) and (4b) shows that a binding
CIA drives a wedge µ, the marginal utility of cash’s liquidity services, between
the marginal utilities of consumption in t = 1 and t = 2:16
µ+
β
p2c2
=
1
p1c1
.
According to (4c), the wedge µ equals the marginal utility of wealth, λ, times
the excess return of shares over money, R − 1, such that the marginal rate of
intertemporal substitution equals the price ratio times the return on shares:
c2
βc1
=
p1
p2
R.
Given the optimal consumption in t = 1 and 2, the budget constraint (4f) and
the CIA (4g), the optimal investment decision in t = 0 is
s =
β
1 + β
w and
m =
1
1 + β
w.
An individual investor has consumption demands of17
c1 =
w
(1 + β) p1
and
c2 =
βRw
(1 + β) p2
.
Finally, the investment and consumption decisions of individual investors i can
be aggregated to aggregate investment and consumption. Let capital letters
denote aggregate values of the respective variable, i.e. W ≡
∫
i∈I wdi, M ≡∫
i∈I mdi, S ≡
∫
i∈I sdi, C1 ≡
∫
i∈I c1di and C2 ≡
∫
i∈I c2di. Given I = [0; 1], the
following Proposition 1 summarises the situation under certainty:
Proposition 1 In the symmetric equilibrium under certainty, investors split their
wealth in money
(
M = 11+βW
)
and shares
(
S = β1+βW
)
and consumeC1 =
1
p1(1+β)
W
and C2 =
βR
p2(1+β)
W . The asset price q = 1 and no assets are traded in the symmetric
equilibrium.
Plugging R = 1/β into the results of Proposition 1 yields a special result:
16Note that µ ≥ 0 represents the standard complementary slackness condition: If the CIA is not
binding (µ = 0), the marginal utility of money’s liquidity services is zero; but if the marginal utility
of money’s liquidity services is positive, the liquidity constraint becomes binding (µ > 0).
17For completeness, the Lagrangian parameters are λ = 1+β
Rw
and µ = λ (R− 1).
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Corollary 1 If the interest rate R equals the discount rate 1/β, investors spend the
same amount of money in both periods, i.e. p1C1 = p2C2, and consume the same
amount of goods, i.e. C1 = C2, if prices remain constant.
To concentrate on the intertemporal substitution effects of liquidity prefer-
ence shocks, I start from the situation in Corollary 1 with perfect consumption
smoothing and thus assume βR = 1where useful below.
2.2.2 Goods production and goods market
Because I want to focus on events on the asset market, in particular on the
effects of emergency liquidity provision by the central bank in section 3, and
the direct spillover effects to the goods market, the model includes a very styl-
ised version of a goods market. Non-storable goods are produced by a mass
of 1 of identical competitive firms at the beginning of periods t = 1, 2 with
total labour input Nt = N¯ from identical workers who cannot participate on
the asset market and capital inputKt according to a Cobb-Douglas production
function
Yt = K
α
t N¯
1−α (5)
with 0 < α < 1. Trade on the goods market takes place after the realisation
of the liquidity shock for investors and after trade on the asset market. While
aggregate supply is already produced and thus fixed at Yt, aggregate demand
consists of demand fromworkers based on their nominal labour income ψt and
from investors as derived in the previous section.
Given a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale and
perfect competition, the Euler theorem states that production factors are paid
their marginal product times the respective factor input. With the production
function (5), workers should receive the share of total output Yt that reflects
their relative importance in production as captured by 1 − α, while capital
owners should receive αYt. Furthermore, I assume that investors’ demand Ct
represents the whole factor income of capital, such that Ct = αYt and that the
real investment S determines the constant producible aggregate real supply Y¯
with ∂Y¯ /∂K · dK/dS > 0.18
Since I have a model in nominal units, labour income for period t is deter-
mined in nominal wage negotiations between workers and firms19 at the end
of period t − 1 such that their expected real income is Ψt = (1 − α)Yt. Hence,
the agreed nominal wage is ψt = ΨtEt−1[pt] = (1 − α)YtEt−1[pt] given the
18Although this is an obvious departure from a full general equilibriummodel where the income
from capital is directly linked to the marginal product of capital, the crucial effects of the model
should still hold in general equilibrium under the assumption of a cash-in-advance constraint for
investors and limited asset market participation.
19Firms only produce consumption goods and negotiate wages in the model.
13
expected price level Et−1 [pt]. E0[p1] is normalised to 1.20 For simplicity, I as-
sume that workers build their price expectations based on the quantity equa-
tion, i.e. they expect that investors use all their available nominal funds for
the purchase of consumption goods in the respective period.21 Hence, money
holdingsM = W − S = E0 [p1C1] and the supply of goods Y¯ represent the in-
formation set for the wage negotiations in t = 0. The nominal return from the
investment RS plus any unusedM from t = 1 equal E1 [p2C2]. Together with
Y s2 , this provides the information for the negotiations in t = 1. The expected
nominal demand Et−1 [ptCt] in turn has to be equal to the expected income
share of capital, Et−1 [pt]αYt. Due to the normalisation E0 [p1] = 1, C1 = αY¯ .22
Under certainty, this also means that E1 [p2] = p2 = 1 as well if βR = 1 be-
cause the CIA binds (µ > 0) and investors transfer no money to t = 2. Hence,
investors’ nominal funds are thus identical in t = 1 and 2. If βR 6= 1, investors’
nominal funds differ in both periods under certainty. The nominal wage nego-
tiations in t = 1 determine ψ2 such that the price p2 adjusts such that workers
receive 1 − α and investors α of the constant aggregate supply Y¯ in t = 2.
Hence, aggregate demand Y dt and aggregate supply Y
s
t are
Y dt =
ψt
pt
+ Ct = Ψt + Ct and (6)
Y st = Y¯ . (7)
To summarise the equilibrium on the goods market under certainty for βR = 1,
the expected price of goods Et−1 [pt] equals the actual price pt = 1 for t = 1, 2.
Investors consume C1 = C2 = W/ (1 + β), while total production equals Y1 =
Y2 = W/ [α (1 + β)] and workers consume 1−αα times investors’ consumption,
i.e. Ψ1 = Ψ2 = 1−αα W/(1 + β).
2.3 Aggregate Risk
What is the efficient response to a positive aggregate demand shock in t =
1? If the supply of goods can be adjusted to the increased demand, it will be
increased until themarginal costs of doing so equal themarginal benefit. In this
model, production takes place before the shock, so the liquidation technology
offers the only way to increase supply in t = 1. Since the liquidation costs are
very high, investors will use it only for large shocks. In an intermediate range,
prices adjust such that the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution equals
20This assumption avoids any problems with a possible indeterminacy of the price level.
21For example, Illing (1997) andWalsh (2003)model aggregate demandwith a quantity equation.
22Actually, C1 is determined byW , S and p1 (see table 2). With nominalW and real C1 = αY
fixed, p1 is no free parameter any more. But the link between S and K and thus Y¯ could be
normalised such that E0[p1] = 1.
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the relative prices.
Since the optimal investment strategy in t = 0 depends on expectations about
developments on the asset and the goods market in t = 1 and 2, the model
has to be solved by backward induction. Hence, the allocations on the goods
market in t = 2 and t = 1 as well as the influence of the shocks on the optimal
behaviour of investors on the asset market in t = 1 have to be taken into ac-
count when one solves the utility maximisation problem of investors in t = 0.
For illustrative purposes, however, it will be easier to begin with the descrip-
tion of the asset market, turn to the goods market afterwards and then solve
the initial investment problem given the behaviour in t = 1, 2.
2.3.1 Asset market
The optimal investment decision problem for an individual investor under ag-
gregate risk becomes
max
s,c1,c2,sˆ,z
E [U(c′1, c2)] =
∫ ∞
−∞
(γ ln (c1 + ρz) + β ln c2) f(γ)dγ s.t. (8)
p1c1 + p2c2 ≤ w − s+Rs+ (R− q)sˆ−Rz
p1c1 + qsˆ ≤ w − s
0 ≤ z ≤ s.
The solution to this maximisation problem in section A of the appendix uses
the Leibniz-Rule and yields as first order conditions
∂Λ
∂c1
=
γ
c1 + ρz
− λp1 − µp1 = 0 (9a)
∂Λ
∂c2
=
β
c2
− λp2 = 0 (9b)
∂Λ
∂sˆ
= λ (R− q)− µq = 0 (9c)
∂Λ
∂z
=
γ
c1 + ρz
ρ− λR ≤ 0 (9d)
∂Λ
∂λ
= −p1c1 − p2c2 + w + (R− 1) s+ (R− q)sˆ−Rz ≥ 0 (9e)
∂Λ
∂µ
= −p1c1 − qsˆ+ w − s ≥ 0 (9f)
dΛ
ds
=
∫ ∞
−∞
[λ (R− 1)− µ] f (γ) dγ = 0. (9g)
and ∂Λ
∂z
z = 0, ∂Λ
∂λ
λ = 0 and ∂Λ
∂µ
µ = 0 as complementary slackness conditions.23
23As for the maximisation problem (3) under certainty, the second-order conditions for a max-
imum are fulfilled since (8) maximises a strictly concave utility function under linear constraints
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Since all investors are identical without idiosyncratic risk, they all want to sell
or buy assets in response to an aggregate liquidity shock γ at the same time
in t = 1 in order to adjust their money holdings optimally to their desired
consumption which is subject to the CIA. As the aggregate stock of assets is
determined in t = 0, however, they cannot sell or buy in the aggregate. Hence,
the asset price q has to adjust to exclude any excess demand or supply of assets,
i.e. market clearing in t = 1 requires that Sˆ =
∫
i∈I sˆdi = 0.
Depending on the realisation of the liquidity shock γ, the asset price q, the
Lagrangian parameters λ and µ and the choice variables c1, c2 and z lie in three
different ranges. For γ < β(W−S)
RS
≡ CIA, investors want to transfer wealth
into the next period. This drives up the asset price q, which is bounded by R:
Nobodywould be willing to paymore for the asset than the asset’s fixed payoff
in the next period. In this case, the CIA becomes non-binding (µ = 0).
For greater values of γ, however, the CIA is binding and the asset price de-
pends on the cash in the market as in Allen and Gale (1994, 2005). As long as
investors do not liquidate their assets, the asset price captures the full effect of
γ ∈
[
β(W−S)
RS
; β(W−S)
p1ρS
]
. For sufficiently large liquidity shocks γ > β(W−S)
p1ρS
≡
LIQ, the asset price q falls to a level where the investors become indifferent
between liquidating the asset and selling the asset. Since they cannot sell in
the aggregate, they costly liquidate part of their assets (z > 0). Table 2 sum-
marises the equilibrium values of the relevant variables in the three ranges of
γ.24 Figure 4 illustrates the asset price q and the two Lagrangian parameters on
the budget constraint and the CIA as a function of γ for R = 1/β = 1.1,W =
1, S = β1+βW,ρ = 0.7. The possibility of a severe drop in q captures the micro-
economic view of liquidity, as an illiquid asset cannot be sold quickly without
costs.
Turning to the optimal investment decision in t = 0, the first-order condition
for optimal investment in the asset is given by equation (9g). Using the re-
sults for λ and µ from table 2 and the definitions of the cumulative distribu-
tion function F (x) ≡
∫ x
−∞ f (γ) dγ of the liquidity shock γ and the function
G (x) ≡
∫ x
−∞ γf (γ) dγ, section A in the appendix shows that the determination
of the optimal investment s requires an explicit parameterisation of the shock’s
density function f (γ). I assume γ to be uniformly distributed between a and
b with 0 < a < b. Table 3 summarises the information which is derived in the
appendix.
There is only one variable left that depends on the realisation of γ, namely the
and the optimum is an interior solution.
24Note that the Cobb-Douglas preferences (2) determine the relative expenditures p1c1 to p2c2
such that c1 is independent from p2 and c2 is independent from p1 in general. Only for γ > LIQ
and thus z > 0, c2 depends on p1ρ because this is the nominal value of liquidation in t = 1.
Without central bank intervention, p1 = 1 in this case as demonstrated the next section 2.3.2.
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Table 2: Summary of the values of the asset price q, the Lagrangian parameters λ and
µ and the choice variables c1, c2 and z after the realisation of γ in t = 1.
γ < β(W−S)
RS
≡ CIA β(W−S)
RS
≤ γ ≤ β(W−S)
p1ρS
γ > β(W−S)
p1ρS
≡ LIQ
q R β(W−S)
γS
p1ρ
λ β+γ
w−s+Rs
β(W−S+RS)
RS(w−s+Rs)
p1ρ(β+γ)
R(w−s+p1ρs)
µ 0 λ
(
γRS
β(W−S) − 1
)
λ
(
R
p1ρ
− 1
)
z 0 0 γp1ρs−β(w−s)
p1ρ(β+γ)
c1
γ
p1(β+γ)
(w − s+Rs) w−s
p1
w−s
p1
c2
β
p2(β+γ)
(w − s+Rs) Rs
p2
βR(w−s+p1ρs)
p2p1ρ(β+γ)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Value of γ
 CIA  LIQ
q
λ
µ
Figure 4: q, λ, µ as a function of γ and given different parameter values.
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Table 3: Summary of f(γ), F (γ), G(γ) in t = 1.
γ ∈ [a; b] γ /∈ [a; b] γ = CIA γ = LIQ
f(γ) 1
b−a 0
1
b−a
1
b−a
F (γ) γ−a
b−a 0
β(W−S)
RS
−a
b−a
β(W−S)
p1ρS
−a
b−a
G(γ) γ−a
b−a ·
1
2 (γ + a) 0
F (CIA) ·
1
2
(
β(W−S)
RS
+ a
) F (LIQ) ·
1
2
(
β(W−S)
p1ρS
+ a
)
goods price p1, which is determined on the goods market as described in the
following section. As noted above, however, the utility function (2) implies
that p1 only matters for λ, µ,Ct in the range γ ≥
β(W−S)
p1ρS
. Table 2 shows that
in this range investors use all their nominal funds w − s to buy consumption
goods on the goods market. The detailed description of the goods market in
the next section 2.3.2 shows that p1 = 1 in this case. Given this information,
one can now solve for the optimal investment in the asset s.
Figure 5 illustrates that the optimal investment is decreasing in the standard
deviation of γ, σ (γ) = b−a
2
√
3
, while this effect is more pronounced for a lower
real payoff of the liquidation technology ρ. Without aggregate risk, proposi-
tion 1 states that investors hold S = β1+βW ≈ 0.4762 for R = 1/β = 1.1 and
W = 1. Initially, introducing aggregate risk does not affect S because the asset
price q absorbs the full impact of the liquidity shock for the chosen parameter
values, i.e. the CIA always binds (F (CIA) = 0) and no assets are liquidated
(F (LIQ) = 1) given the equilibrium S. Further increasing σ (γ) makes the
risk-averse investors reduce their investment S. As the real payoff of liquida-
tions Z increases in ρ and the liquidation threshold LIQ decreases in S, the
reduction in S caused by increased aggregate risk is dampened by a greater ρ
and the solid line (ρ = 0.9) lies above the dashed line (ρ = 0.5) in figure 5.
This is the solution of the model with aggregate risk and access to a costly real
liquidation technology for investors. The analysis of an emergency liquidity
assistance by the central bank requires at first a deeper discussion of the goods
market in the next section. Furthermore, the costs and benefits of such an inter-
vention need to be based on an explicit welfare function for the central bank. I
turn to this issue in section 3.
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Figure 5: Optimal investment S for R = 1/β = 1.1 andW = 1.
2.3.2 Goods market
Investors’ liquidity shocks in t = 1 can spill over to the goods market via a
demand effect in t = 1 and a supply effect in t = 2. Let η denote the first
channel that links the asset market and the goodsmarket: For small realisations
of the liquidity shock γ < CIA, the CIA of investors becomes non-binding and
they do not use all their money for consumption in t = 1. This represents a
negative nominal aggregate demand shock on the goods market, represented
by η < 0. If the liquidity shock γ is in the range of CIA ≤ γ ≤ LIQ, the asset
price q absorbs the full effect of the liquidity shock as noted in the previous
section and investors’ nominal demand p1C1 = W − S. For large liquidity
shocks γ > LIQ, investors liquidate part of their assets and thus increase the
total resources available for consumption in t = 1 beyond Y¯ . Since investors
satisfy ρZ of their desired consumption goods with the liquidation technology,
they still demand p1C1 = W − S on the goods market. If, however, the central
bank intervenes on the asset market and injects additional money in case of
large realisations of γ as will be shown in the following section 3, investors’
nominal demand rises above the level expected in the wage negotiations. This
is represented by a positive aggregate demand shock η > 0.
The rest of aggregate demand depends on nominal labour income ψt, which is
determined in nominal wage negotiations at t− 1 as explained in section 2.2.2:
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Perfect competition and the Cobb-Douglas production function (5) require that
workers can consume (1− α)Yt in t given the expected price level Et−1 [pt]
which is normalised to 1 for t = 1. Workers build their price expectations based
on the quantity equation, i.e. they expect that the total amount of money held
by investors at the time of the wage negotiations is spent in t = 1. Hence, the
expected nominal demand E0 [p1C1] = W − S has to be equal to the expected
capitalists’ income share E0 [p1]αYt = αY¯ as E0 [p1] = 1.25 Therefore, the
aggregate demand relationship from equation (6) becomes
Y d1 =
ψ1 +W − S + η
p1
, (10)
while aggregate supply is again fixed to26
Y s1 = Y¯ .
Note that the price impact of nominal demand shocks η originating from the
asset market is less than 1 as ψ1 is constant. Hence, the first channel that links
the asset with the goodsmarket, η, causes a redistribution effect from investors’
consumption share at p1 = 1 towards workers for η < 0 and from workers to-
wards investors for η > 0. Given the determination of E0 [p1] described above,
positive price shocks can only occur with additional money from the central
bank which will be discussed extensively in the following section 3.
The exercise of the real put option acquired with the asset s, i.e. the applica-
tion of the costly liquidation technique, in response to large liquidity shocks
γ > LIQ with no or insufficient emergency liquidity assistance by the central
bank causes the second link between the asset market and the goods market:
Without costly liquidations, the capital stock Kt is fixed over the time horizon
of this model and aggregate output is Y¯ , given the initial investment S. If in-
vestors choose to liquidate part of their shares, i.e. Z > 0, this liquidation takes
place after production in t = 1 and increases the real resources available for
consumption in t = 1, but reduces K2. The lower capital input in t = 2 lowers
25This assumption is a short-cut from the rational Erat0 [p1C1] because investors will spend all
their money in t = 1 only as long as their CIA binds, i.e. γ ≥ CIA, and less for γ < CIA. This
implies Erat0 [C1] < C1 (γ ≥ CIA) and E0 [η] < 0 without central bank intervention. Hence,
workers get more than their expected share of aggregate supply Y¯ in t = 1 on average and are
thus implicitly compensated for their real income risk in t = 1. To summarise, the way workers
form their expectations and the normalisation of E0[p1] determine the size of the redistribution
effect of investors’ nominal demand on workers after the realisation of γ, but not the possibility of
such redistributions.
26Y¯ may be different from the one under certainty, however, since it depends on S which may
decrease with the extent of aggregate risk as demonstrated in figure 5.
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Y¯ by ∆(Z), with d∆
dZ
> 0, and aggregate supply becomes
Y s2 = Y¯ −∆(Z). (11)
Any risk has disappeared from the model at the time of the nominal wage ne-
gotiations for t = 2. Workers build their price expectations E1 [p2] based on
investors’ safe nominal revenues R (S − Z), potentially unused money hold-
ings W − S − p1C1 and the known Y s2 . Again, perfect competition allows
them to consume Ψ2 = (1− α)Y2, which implies a nominal wage of ψ2 =
E1 [p2] (1− α)Y2.
27 The aggregate demand equation for t = 2 then is
Y d2 =
ψ2 +R (S − Z) +W − S − p1C1
p2
. (12)
and equals aggregate supply at p2 = E1 [p2] in equilibrium:
Ψ2 + C2 = Y¯ −∆(Z).
p2 and its expected value adjust relative to p1 such that investors’ real con-
sumption C2 = α
[
Y¯ −∆(Z)
]
. For example, if investors’ liquidity shock γ
is within the intermediate range CIA < γ < LIQ, the CIA is binding and
W − S = p1C1, but no assets are liquidated, i.e. Z = 0. (12) reduces to
Y d2 =
ψ2 +RS
p2
and p2 = p1 = 1 for βR = 1 and a sufficiently small variance of γ that leaves
S = β/ (1 + β)W from the certainty case unaffected (see also figure 5). Since
investors’ Cobb-Douglas-preferences smooth nominal expenditures over t = 1
and 2, p2 has no effect on investors’ behaviour in t = 1 given S.
To summarise, the two direct channels that link the asset market to the goods
market in this model are the aggregate demand shock η in period 1 and the
aggregate supply shock∆ in period 2, which both depend on the realisation of
the liquidity shock γ in t = 1.
27Note again that investors do not react to possible changes of p2 relative to a constant p1 because
the Cobb-Douglas-preferences determine the expenditure share rather than real consumption in
each period. Hence, given the constant produceable aggregate supply Y¯ and workers’ desired
income of (1− α)Y2, p2 would have to deviate from p1 even if γ = E0 [γ] = 1 for example if
βR 6= 1 in order to equate investors’ intertemporal rate of substitution to the relative price p1/p2
for constant real consumption C2 = C1 = αY¯ .
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3 Central bank intervention
3.1 Welfare function
The direct spillover effects from the asset market to the goods market mean
that the central bank may intervene on the asset market even if it does not take
investors’ welfare into account. The loss function L of the central bank consists
of the weighted sum of two parts: The increase of p1 above the desired price
level p∗1 because of the associated real income loss of workers and the deviation
of aggregate supply Y s2 from Y¯ caused by liquidations Z,∆(Z):
28
L = (p1 − p
∗
1)− ω
(
Y s2 − Y¯
)
. (13)
ω reflects the weight on the real income loss of workers in t = 2 relative to
the weight on the real income loss of workers in t = 1 caused by a rise in p1
and thus implicitly includes the central bank’s time discount factor. Let p∗1 be
normalised to 1 and thus equal the expected price level E0 [p1]. It is sufficient
to concentrate on p1 and Y s2 in this stylised model because Y
s
1 is produced
before any shocks occur and thus not directly influencable by monetary policy
under discretion29 and nominal wage negotiations for t = 2 take place after
any shocks and determine p2 such that workers receive Ψt = (1− α)Y s2 .
The concentration on goods markets can be justified with several arguments:
From a positive perspective because price stability and - differently accentu-
ated - output stability are the mandate of most central banks in the world,
where price stability is generally interpreted as a low but positive growth rate
of some form of a consumer price index. From a political economy perspective,
since people living mainly from their nominal labour income represent the ma-
jority of voters in a society and, as I show in this paper, this focus may even
improve the welfare of investors as well. Finally, also from a normative per-
spective within the New Keynesian framework as argued by Woodford (2003)
because asset prices are in general a lot more flexible than goods prices and the
monetary authority should focus on a measure of relatively sticky core infla-
tion to limit the distortions caused by nominal rigidities.30
28The discussion below shows that the central bank cannot intervene symmetrically in this
model. Hence, the linear loss function represents a useful simplification. The results of the model
are robust to a loss function that is quadratic in inflation and output deviations from their re-
spective targets, but the comparative static analysis and the restrictions on some parameter values
become more complex (see section B in the appendix).
29The indirect effect of central bank intervention on aggregate supply will be analysed in section
3.5. Section 3.6 discusses how optimal monetary policy can take the indirect effect into account.
30Note, however, that the normative argument has been subject of a long discussion inmacroeco-
nomics that goes far beyond the scope of this paper. For example, Woodford’s argument neglects
the information content of asset prices about future consumer price inflation that was emphasised
by Alchian and Klein (1973). These authors concluded that asset prices should receive a very high
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3.2 Asset market
The central bank has the possibility to prevent the costly liquidation of shares
if it acts as a lender or rather liquidity provider of last resort to the financial
market. That means, it can enter repurchasing agreements with investors at a
price (just) high enough to prevent liquidations and thus provide extra liquid-
ity to the market. In such an emergency repurchasing agreement, the central
bank buys l assets at a nominal price q and sells them to the same investor in
t = 2 for the asset’s nominal payoff R. The total amount L ≡
∫
i∈I ldi of assets
bought, their buying price q and thus the liquidity costs for investors
(
R− q
)
L
all depend on the preferences of the central bank in (13).31 As in section 2.3, I
begin with the asset market and an investors’ optimal behaviour.
The possibility of a central bank intervention alters the optimal investment de-
cision problem for an individual investor. Themaximisation problem (8) under
aggregate risk becomes
max
s,c1,c2,sˆ,z,l
E [U(c′1, c2)] =
∫ ∞
−∞
(γ ln (c1 + ρz) + β ln c2) f(γ)dγ s.t. (14)
p1c1 + p2c2 ≤ w − s+Rs+ (R− q)sˆ−Rz −
(
R− q
)
l
p1c1 + qsˆ ≤ w − s+ ql
0 ≤ z ≤ s; 0 ≤ l ≤ s; l + z ≤ s.
The problem (14) is solved as in section 2.3.1. While the first-order conditions
(9a) to (9d) and (9g) remain unchanged, the derivatives with respect to the
Lagrangian parameters (9e) and (9f) become
∂Λ
∂λ
= −p1c1 − p2c2 + w + (R− 1) s+ (R− q)sˆ−Rz −
(
R− q
)
l ≥ 0 (15a)
∂Λ
∂µ
= −p1c1 − qsˆ+ w − s+ ql ≥ 0 (15b)
weight in the price index that the central bank tries to stabilise; their argument was rejected mostly
for practical reasons (see Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000), for example).
The modern discussion rather ranges between Bernanke and Gertler (1999), who argue that
asset price changes are only relevant for monetary policy insofar as they change the forecasts of
consumer price inflation and output, while Cecchetti et al. (2000) favour a more direct response
to asset prices because this should limit the extent of asset price bubbles and thus dampen the
volatility of output and inflation. The discussion below shows that the spillover effects from the
asset to the goodsmarket justify a direct monetary policy response to asset prices even if the central
bank neglects the welfare of asset holders and there are no bubbles.
31The individual costs of emergency liquidity provision

R− q

l represent a deadweight loss
in the model. Actually, these costs equal the nominal seigniorage income for the central bank.
Section 3.6 includes a discussion of the optimal use of this seigniorage income.
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and the new first-order condition
∂Λ
∂l
= −λ
(
R− q
)
+ µq ≤ 0, l ≥ 0 (16)
is added to the system.
In order to limit the increase of the price level on the goods market p1 caused
by the extra liquidity in the market, the central bank will provide this liquidity
at the highest cost for investors that still prevent the costly liquidation, i.e. q is
as low as possible. Since (16) implies that λ
(
R
q
− 1
)
= µ for l > 0, it is obvious
from (9c) that q = q in equilibrium in this case. At the same time, the discussion
in section 2.3.1 shows that λ
(
R
p1ρ
− 1
)
= µ for z > 0, i.e. γ > LIQ. q = p1ρ = q
causes investors’ indifference between consuming by liquidating assets (z > 0)
or by buying c1 for p1 on the goods market with cash from selling the asset at
q to the central bank or at q on the asset market. Hence, q = p1ρ is the lowest
price at which the central bank can prevent costly liquidations in response to
large liquidity shocks γ.
3.3 Goods market
A closer look at the goods market in t = 1 and 2 illuminates the mechanism
of the model and the trade-off the central bank faces. In particular, the central
bank needs to quantify the costs and benefits of additional liquidity to deter-
mine the optimal amount of nominal aggregate liquidity provision.
As in section 2.3.2, the aggregate demand shock η in (10) can be negative in
t = 1, as investors transfer money into t = 2 for γ < CIA. Due to the central
bank intervention, however, η can also be positive. For γ > LIQ, the central
bank increases the amount of money available for consumption purchases in
the economy by qL. Since aggregate supply is already produced at the begin-
ning of t = 1, the additional nominal funds qL cause a rise in the price of goods
p1 by τqL.32 Given workers’ fixed nominal wage ψ1, this price increase reduces
workers’ real consumptionΨ1 and increases the amount of goods investors can
buy on the goods market with money. Investors’ total consumption C ′1 is then
the sum of goods bought on the goods market C1 with initial money holdings
plus the liquidity provision qL and the proceeds from the real liquidation ρZ
that the central bank optimally admits. Crucially, once the nominal wage ψ
is fixed based on the expected nominal demand such that workers expect to
receive (1− α) Y¯ , a liquidity provision by the central bank that exceeds work-
ers’ expectations, independent of their expectation formation mechanism, will
32Using the parameters and variables of the model, the price impact can be expressed as τ =
αp1ρ/ (W − S). To simplify the exposition of the arguments, I continue to use τ for the price
impact of L.
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always induce this redistribution effect and increase the amount of real funds
available for investors’ consumption in t = 1.
At the same time, the real liquidation of Z assets causes a reduction of aggre-
gate supply in t = 2 by∆(Z) = κZ.33 As the central bank intervention reduces
the amount of liquidations by L, it increases Y s2 proportionately by κL. Hence,
aggregate supply Y s2 = Y¯ − κZ, where Z denotes the amount of optimally
admitted liquidations, and the aggregate demand equation (12) becomes
Y d2 =
ψ2 +R (S − Z − L) +W − S − p1C1
p2
. (17)
Since any risk in the model is dissolved by the time of the wage negotiations
for t = 2, the nominal wage ψ2 guarantees a real consumption of Ψ2 =
(1− α)
(
Y¯ − κZ
)
and E1 [p2] = p2. As in section 2.3.2, p2 = p1 = 1, if γ ∈
[CIA,LIQ], βR = 1 and S = β/ (1 + β)W , for example.
3.4 Optimal central bank intervention
The trade-off between the price impact τ and the output effect κ determines
the optimal amount of liquidity L∗ provided by the central bank. I define Z∗
as the aggregate amount of liquidated assets in response to a shock γ in the
absence of central bank intervention, i.e. Z∗ ≡
∫
i∈I zdi =
γp1ρS−β(W−S)
p1ρ(β+γ)
with
z = γp1ρs−β(w−s)
p1ρ(β+γ)
taken from table 2 in section 2.3.1. The liquidation of Z∗
produces an output loss of κZ∗ in t = 2with κ > 0. An intervention ofL causes
an increase in p1 of τqL with τ > 0 above the expected price level E0 [p1] = 1.
At the same time, it reduces the extent of costly liquidations Z∗ by L, which
increases aggregate supply in t = 2 by κL. I assume ωκ > ρτ such that the
value of the output gain is sufficiently high for a positive level of L in response
to large shocks γ. The endogeneity of the lowest intervention price q = p1ρ
implies that
p1 = 1 + τqL
⇔ p1 = 1 + τp1ρL
⇔ p1 =
1
1− τρL
(18)
33The linearity of the output loss serves again the purpose of expositional ease. Given the way
the size of the economy Y¯ is linked to the amount of assets S, κ = R/ (αp2).
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and requires τρL < 1 for an equilibrium. Given this information about the
price and output impacts of its intervention, the central bank optimises
min
L
L = (p1 − p
∗
1)− ω
(
Y s2 − Y¯
)
(19)
=
(
1
1− τρL
− 1
)
− ω
(
Y¯ − κ (Z∗ − L)− Y¯
)
=
τρL
1− τρL
+ ωκ
(
γS − β(W−S)(1−τρL)
ρ
β + γ
− L
)
.
In the optimum, the marginal costs of higher prices p1 just equal the marginal
benefit of greater output Y s2 ,
dL
dL
=
τρ
(1− τρL)
2 + ωκ
(
β (W − S) τ
β + γ
− 1
)
!
= 0
⇔
τρ
(1− τρL)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct marginal cost of dp1
dL
+ ωκ
β (W − S) τ
β + γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect marginal cost of
∂Y s2
∂Z∗
· ∂Z∗
∂p1
· dp1
dL
= ωκ︸︷︷︸ .
marginal benefit of
∂Y s2
∂L
(20)
Note that dZ
∗
dL
> 0 since the goods price increase associated with L > 0 makes
the real liquidation technologymore attractive. The optimal liquidity provision
L∗ that fulfills the stability criterion τρL < 1 is
L∗ =
1
ρτ
−
√
β + γ
ωκτρ [β + γ − β (W − S) τ ]
. (21)
Proposition 2 The optimal amount of assets purchased by the central bank L∗ in-
creases in the size of the liquidity shock γ, the weight on the output gap ω and its
marginal reduction of output losses κ. L∗ decreases in its marginal price impact τ , the
real payoff of the liquidation technology ρ and the amount of money W − S initially
held by investors if ωκ > ρτ and γ > LIQ.
Proof. The derivatives of L∗ in equation (21) are positive with respect to γ, ω, κ
and negative with respect to ρ, τ given the assumptions about the parameters.
Proposition 2 shows that the central bank will provide more liquidity in re-
sponse to a greater shock γ because it reduces the indirect marginal costs of
intervening.34 The opposite is true for larger money holdingsW −S and more
investment in the illiquid asset S: More initial liquidity increases the marginal
34If the loss function (13) was quadratic in the output gap in t = 2, also the marginal benefit of
Lwould increase with Z∗ and thus with γ (see section B in the appendix).
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costs of L as the same endogenous rise of p1 raises the desired liquidations Z∗
by more. Furthermore, L∗ increases with the weight on output gap stabilisa-
tion relative to price stabilisation, ω, because this makes an output loss due to
liquidation more costly relative to a price increase due to central bank inter-
vention. A greater output impact κ of an intervention or a smaller price impact
τ also improve the benefits of intervening relative to its costs and thus raise
L∗. Finally, a greater ρ amplifies the price impact of the necessary intervention
ceteris paribus and thus lowers L∗.
A special situation arises if the central bank provides so much liquidity that p1
rises until p1ρ = q = R. A further increase of q means that the central bank
actually pays investors not to liquidate their assets and µ < 0 from (9c). But
q > R may become necessary as it is the nominal value of the asset’s real put
option in t = 1, p1ρ, that determines Z, not the asset’s final payoff R (see table
2). This situation will not occur, however, as long as
p1 <
R
ρ
⇔
1
1− τρL∗
<
R
ρ
.
Taking L∗ from (21) and neglecting the indirect marginal costs of L that reduce
L∗ shows that
1
1− τρ
(
1
ρτ
−
√
1
ωκτρ
) < R
ρ
⇔ R
√
τ
ωκρ
> 1
is a sufficient condition for p1 < Rρ and thus q < R.
3.5 Welfare implications and the moral hazard effect
How is the utility and the behaviour of investors affected by the central bank
intervention? First, the central bank chooses q such that it can prevent the real
liquidation of L∗ assets at the lowest price impact, i.e. q = p1ρ. At this price,
the individual costs of liquidating the asset (R − p1ρ) and the costs of selling
it to the central bank in exchange for cash (R − q) are identical. (9c), (9d) and
(16) show that individual investors are indifferent between liquidating, selling
to the central bank and selling on the market as q = p1ρ = q. Nevertheless, the
central bank intervention raises the welfare of investors ceteris paribus because
it lessens the cash-in-advance constraint via the endogenous rise of p1 and the
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corresponding increase in the value of the asset in t = 1, p1ρ = q = q.35 Since
the nominal income of workers and the supply of goods Y s1 = Y¯ are fixed, the
price increase causes a redistribution from workers to investors in t = 1.
The anticipation of central bank intervention also affects the initial investment
decision of investors. The first-order condition for optimal investment in the
asset is (9g),
dL
ds
=
∫ ∞
−∞
[λ (R− 1)− µ] f (γ) dγ = 0. (22)
In the optimum, the excess return of the asset over money (R− 1) evaluated
with the expected marginal utility of wealth λ equals the expected marginal
utility of money’s liquidity services µ. Investors anticipate that the central
bankwill provide extra liquidity for some realisations of γ. These interventions
raise the rationally expected price of goods E0 [p1] relative to the one without
expectations of interventions. The higher expected price level lowers the value
of money’s nominal payoff relative to the liquidated asset’s real payoff of ρ
in t = 1, or, in nominal terms, raises the nominal value of a liquidated asset
p1ρ relative to the constant nominal payoff of money of 1. Since the asset be-
comesmore valuable relative tomoney, investors will increase their investment
s. This represents the so-called moral hazard effect of central bank intervention
because investors increase their holdings of the asset whose value is possibly
subject to liquidity risk as they anticipate the liquidity provision by the central
bank.
Proposition 3 The anticipation of a central bank intervention in t = 1 to limit the
extent of real liquidations of the asset causes an increase in the investment in the asset
S relative to the case without the possibility of a central bank intervention.
Proof. The moral hazard effect arises for two reasons. Taking the aggregate
investment level S as given, the higher goods price p1 first raises the optimal
amount of assets liquidated or sold to the central bank because ∂z
∂p1
|γ>LIQ > 0
(for z, λ, µ, see the last column of table 2). This is reflected in (22) in a lower
expected marginal utility of money, ∂µ
∂p1
|γ>LIQ < 0, and a greater marginal
utility of wealth, ∂λ
∂p1
|γ>LIQ > 0. Second, the increase in p1 lowers the threshold
of the realisation of γ, LIQ = β(W−S)
p1ρS
, for which Z and L become positive.
Since CIA = β(W−S)
RS
remains unchanged for a given S, the lower LIQ reduces
the intermediate range CIA ≤ γ ≤ LIQ for which the effect of the liquidity
shock is fully absorbed by the asset price and consumption remains unchanged
(see table 2). The constant consumption levels imply that themarginal utility of
wealth, λ, is also constant in this range, while the cash-in-advance constraint
becomes very costly, i.e. µ rises rapidly with γ. Equation (22) shows that a
35See also figure 6 and the discussion of the moral hazard effect below.
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Figure 6: q, λ, µ as a function of γ and different parameter values for p1 = 1 (dashed
line) and p1 = 1.2 (solid line).
greater expected marginal utility of wealth and a smaller expected marginal
utility of money increase the optimal individual investment s. This raises also
the aggregate investment S =
∫
i∈I sdi in equilibrium.
The two effects can be seen in figure 6 which replicates figure 4 for the case of
no central bank intervention. It shows the shift to the left of the threshold LIQ,
i.e. the right kink in the three curves, and the higher values of λ and the lower
values of µ in the range of γ > LIQ for a greater price p1 due to a central bank
intervention.
The moral hazard effect of Proposition 3 can be so severe that investors stop
holding money as stated in the following Corollary 2:
Corollary 2 Holding no money from t = 0 to t = 1 represents an equilibrium if
investors expect the central bank to intervene at a price q greater than 1.
Proof. Assume all investors except i hold only the asset, i.e. S = W . Then,
CIA = LIQ = 0 and the central bank has to intervene with certainty. Equation
(22) simplifies to dL
ds
=
∫∞
−∞
[
(β+γ)(q−1)
w−s+qs
]
f (y) dγ ≥ 0 which will be strictly
positive for E0
[
q
]
> 1 as γ has a positive support, cov(γ, q) > 0 and the
denominator w + (q − 1)s > 0. Hence, investing the full endowment w in the
asset will be optimal for i, i.e. s = w, and S =W represents an equilibrium.
Corollary 2 implies that the parameters of the model, for example the real pay-
off of liquidation ρ or the weight on output stabilisation ω, have to be chosen
such that the liquidity provision is sufficiently costly and E0
[
q
]
sufficiently
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smaller than 1 in order to prevent the possibility of a complete moral hazard
scenario caused by full insurance against liquidity shocks provided by the cen-
tral bank.
What happens to the welfare of workers? Given the investment S, their welfare
clearly rises if the central bank’s relative weight on output in the loss function
(13), ω, represents their own preferences. The central bank sets L∗ and the
corresponding price q such that the marginal cost of the price increase equals
the marginal benefit of less liquidated assets in equation (20). The increase in
S due to the moral hazard effect is double-edged, however: The higher real
investment causes a rise in producible output Y¯ as ∂Y¯ /∂K · dK/dS > 0. At
the same time, it increases the extent of desired liquidations Z∗ and central
bank intervention L∗ ceteris paribus. In general, the overall welfare effect for
workers depends on the gain from greater output Y¯ due to the increase in S
relative to the associated costs in t = 1, 2. The following section discusses the
optimal monetary policy when the central bank takes this additional trade-off
into account. That section also examines what happens if not only investors,
but also workers anticipate the central bank intervention.
3.6 Monetary policy under commitment and other model ex-
tensions
In section 3.4, the optimal central bank intervention in t = 1 was calculated
based on the central bank loss function (13) after the realisation of the liquidity
shock and given aggregate investment S. This reflects the absence of a commit-
ment possibility of the central bank in this model. In other words, the solutions
presented so far represent optimal monetary policy under discretion. The opti-
mal second-best solution given the cash-in-advance constraint, however, could
be achieved by a central bank with the possibility to commit to a specific inter-
vention policy in t = 1 at t = 0.
In that case, the central bank has to optimally weight the increased aggregate
supply Y¯ associated with the moral hazard-effect against the costs of liquida-
tions and interventions in t = 1 and 2. More generally, if private investors
anticipate a liquidity insurance by the central bank, they hold less liquidity
and invest their funds more productively. A lower level of aggregate liquidity,
however, makes the financial sector less resilient, such that financial crises and
central bank interventions become more likely.
Hence, the loss function (13) has to be extended to take the productivity gain
from themoral hazard effect into account. As before, the loss increases in p1−p∗1
and the output costs of liquidations∆(Z). Additionally, the loss decreases with
aggregate output Y¯ , such that optimal monetary policy under commitment
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solves
min
S,L
E0
[
L(Y¯ , p1 − p
∗
1,∆(Z))
]
(23)
to find the optimal level of private investments S and the optimal liquidity
provision L conditional on the realised liquidity shock.
So far in this paper, workers build their price expectations based on the money
holdings W − S of investors (see sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.2). The question what
happens if not only investors, but also workers anticipate the central bank
intervention, is related to the brief discussion in footnote 25 of the effects if
workers’ formed their price expectations in the wage negotiations with ratio-
nal expectations rather than the quantity equation. For a given level of S, the
central bank will provide extra liquidity if γ > LIQ. This increases the ex-
pected amount of cash available for purchases of consumption goods relative
to the situation without central bank intervention and thus raises the expected
price of consumption goods or – in a repeated version of the model – the ex-
pected inflation rate. Since rational workers want to be compensated for the
higher expected price with higher nominal wages, this leads to an ‘inflation
bias’ which the central bank should consider in the optimal monetary policy
under commitment.36 But once wages are determined, the central bank can
always provide more liquidity than expected. Hence, the trade-off in t = 1
between redistribution losses for workers today versus less supply tomorrow
continues to exist, independent of the way workers form their price expecta-
tions.
Another important feature of the central bank intervention is the possibility
of a sterilisation of its intervention before the additional money causes price
increases on the goods market. The example of September 11 in section 1.2
shows that the Fed was indeed able to quickly sterilise the emergency liquidity
issued directly after the terrorist attacks. But this liquidity crisis was mostly
limited to the payments and settlement system. In the other two examples
of section 1.2, the crises in 1987 and 1998, the Fed had to lower interest rates
despite buoyant GDP growth and rising inflation and provide liquidity for a
much longer time to calm themarkets (see figure 1 and the discussion in section
1.2). In these cases, the trade-off analysed in this paper increases in relevance
for the optimal policy response to the crises.37 Nevertheless, a sterilisation-
36Note that although the moral hazard effect lowers private money holdingsW − S, the central
bank intervention still raises the expected overall nominal demand from investors on the goods
market. The reason is that investors reduce their money holdings precisely because they expect an
easing of their CIA on average relative to the situation without central bank intervention.
37Taylor (2005) supports the liquidity provision principle and thus a temporary departure of
interest rates from the recommendations of a Taylor rule that includes only inflation and output.
But he argues that policy should have returned to a standard rule more quickly after the crises in
1987 and 1998, i.e. sterilised the liquidity provision (Taylor, 2005, p. 114).
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possibility of interventions could be easily included into the model by making
the nominal aggregate demand shock η that spills over from the asset to the
goods market a function of the sterilisation possibilities of the central bank.
In themodel so far, the individual costs of emergency liquidity provision
(
R− q
)
l
represented a deadweight loss. Actually, these costs for investors correspond
to seigniorage income for the central bank. If the central bank or the govern-
ment used this seigniorage to buy consumption goods in t = 2, the aggregate
demand equation (12) included the additional term
(
R− q
)
L in the numer-
ator. The welfare effects depend on the use of the real seigniorage income
and should be taken into account accordingly when the central bank provides
liquidity in t = 1. The inclusion of seignorage does not change the general
trade-offs in the model, but it reduces the costs of liquidity provision if the
seigniorage income is distributed to workers.
Finally, the traditional Bagehot (1873) principles suggest that the central bank
should provide liquidity only to an illiquid, but solvent bank. The judgement
between illiquidity and insolvency requires a lot of information about banks’
assets and liabilities on behalf of the lender of last resort, the central bank.
This identification problem transfers to financial markets, where the central
bank faces the question if asset price declines are caused by illiquidity or by
deteriorating fundamentals. In contrast to the case of financial intermediaries,
this judgement seems to be less difficult on financial markets since a number
of illiquidity measures exist and are easily observable: For example, bid-ask
spreads, the quoted depth, i.e. the number of shares available at the bid/ask
price, respectively, the volatility of returns and the size of order flows (see, e.g.,
Chordia et al., 2005). If all of these criteria signal liquidity problems, the central
bank clearly faces a liquidity crisis. It should then act as a ‘liquidity provider
of last resort’ and judge its actions according to the framework developed in
this paper.38
4 Idiosyncratic risk
Having analysed the asset market, the goodsmarket and central bank interven-
tions under aggregate risk in the previous sections, I now focus on the question
under which circumstances idiosyncratic shocks can influence asset prices. If
liquidations are optimal for individual investors, the optimal central bank in-
tervention and the spillover effects to the goods market are identical to the case
under aggregate risk. Hence, this section concentrates on the asset market.
38Besides, my model could also easily capture worsening fundamentals by a lower real value of
the liquidation technology, ρ.
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4.1 Standard model
The optimal investment decision problem for an individual investor under
idiosyncratic risk resembles the one under aggregate risk with central bank
intervention in (14)39
max
s,c1,c2,sˆ,z,l
E [U(c′1, c2)] =
∫ ∞
−∞
(ζi ln (c1 + ρz) + β ln c2) f(γ)dγ s.t. (24)
p1c1 + p2c2 ≤ w − s+Rs+ (R− q)sˆ−Rz −
(
R− q
)
l
p1c1 + qsˆ ≤ w − s+ ql
0 ≤ z ≤ s; 0 ≤ l ≤ s; l + z ≤ s
and is solved analogically. The first-order conditions are the same as in section
3.2 with ζi replacing γ.40 Again, market clearing in t = 1 requires that Sˆ =∫
i∈I sˆdi = 0. Hence, the asset price q has to adjust to equalise excess demand
and supply of assets by individual investors. The crucial difference to the case
with only aggregate risk is that the market clearing condition does not imply
that sˆ = 0 and no assets are traded.
The demand for shares in t = 1 by investor i, sˆi, is determined by
sˆi =
β (w − s)− qζis
q (β + ζi)
. (25)
Note that that the Cobb-Douglas utility function (2) implies that sˆi is a convex
function of ζi for a given asset price q as ∂2sˆi/ (∂ζi)
2
> 0.41
Assume that each investor has an ex-ante probability of one half of belonging
to group Awho receive a shock ζA and to group B with shock ζB , respectively,
and ζA ≥ ζB without loss of generality. The condition E[ζi] = 1 and the pos-
itive support of ζi imply ζA ∈ [1; 2), (ζA + ζB) /2 = 1 and the absence of an
aggregate shock. As usual, market clearing requires∫
i∈A
β (w − s)− qζAs
q (β + ζA)
di+
∫
i∈B
β (w − s)− qζBs
q (β + ζB)
di = 0.
The pricing kernel for q becomes
q = min
[
β (1 + β) (W − S)
[ζA (2− ζA) + β]S
;R
]
for
β (W − S)
S
≥ p1ρ (26)
with W and S defined as before. Without idiosyncratic shocks, i.e. ζi = 1,
39In order to explicitly exclude short sales, the constraint sˆ ≥ −s had to be added to (24). Foot-
note 41 shows that this is redundant given the specification of the model.
40That means equations (9a) to (9d), (9g), (15a), (15b) and (16).
41Furthermore, sˆi > −s as β(w − s) > −qβs such that the short sale constraint is redundant.
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Figure 7: Convexity of sˆi: sˆA, sˆB and Σŝi = sˆA + sˆB as a function of ζA for q = 1
and q = 2.
equation (26) simplifies to q = β (W − S) /S, the same asset price as for γ = 1
in section 2.3.1. The condition β (W − S) /S ≥ p1ρ excludes liquidations z > 0
for ζi = 1.42
Note that q in (26) increases in the heterogeneity of A and B, i.e. in the ab-
solute value |ζi − 1|. The reason is the convexity of sˆi in (25) mentioned above.
The convexity implies that the additional demand of the agents with the low
liquidity shock ζB is always sufficiently large such that agents with the high
shock ζA do not need to liquidate their asset. Figure 7 illustrates the convexity
of sˆi for R = 1/β = 1.1 and S = β/ (1 + β)W , the investment in the case of
certainty. The solid line represents the excess demand for the asset which is 0
for ζA = 1, given an asset price of q = 1 in the left panel. For ζA > 1 (and
thus ζB = 2− ζA < 1), sˆB rises faster than sˆA falls, the excess demand becomes
positive and q > 1 for ζA > 1. For ζA ≈ 1.413, the asset price increases to q = R,
since the excess demand is 0 at this combination of q and ζA in the right panel.
For ζA > 1.413, investors hit by the low shock ζB transfer money into t = 2 as
their CIA becomes unbinding.
To summarise the effects, the structure of the model, in particular the Cobb-
Douglas utility function (2) that causes the convexity of sˆi and the dissolution
of risk in t = 1, imply that idiosyncratic shocks alleviate the CIA given a fixed
initial investment S. In general, however, idiosyncratic shocks can have a neg-
ative impact on asset prices if the absorption capacity of the market is limited.
This happens in reality and in other models for example if investors are risk-
42The more general form of (26) is q = min
h
max

β(1+β)(W−S)
[ζA(2−ζA)+β]S
; p1ρ

;R
i
.
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averse and future returns are risky (see, e.g., Huang andWang, 2006).A further
feature of reality is the presence of brokers and market-makers on financial
markets rather than a Walrasian auctioneer. As they smooth price fluctuations
by providing liquidity to financial markets, they earn income in the form of
bid-ask spreads. Models that analyse the microstructure of financial markets
explain the behaviour of these market participants and the implications for
transaction prices. The following section presents an extension to the stan-
dard model of this section that includes transaction costs in the form of bid-ask
spreads, and section 4.3 discusses different mechanisms how small shocks can
have large impacts.
4.2 Model with transaction costs
The market microstructure literature has developed models based on order-
handling costs, asymmetric information or strategic behaviour, where idiosyn-
cratic shocks can have (severe) impacts on asset prices. As Biais, Glosten and
Spatt (2005, p. 218) formulate it:
In perfect markets, Walrasian equilibrium prices reflect the compet-
itive demand curves of all potential investors. While the determi-
nation of these fundamental equilibrium valuations is the focus of
(most) asset pricing, market microstructure studies how, in the short
term, transaction prices converge to (or deviate from) long-term equi-
librium values.
A full market microstructure model is beyond the scope of this paper, but the
most important literature in this field is discussed in section 5.3. A simple way
to summarise the relevant issues of market microstructure as developed, e.g.,
in O’Hara (1995) and Biais et al. (2005), is to assume transaction costs in the
form of a bid-ask spread Ξ that decreases in total liquidityM =
∫
i∈I mdi avail-
able and increases in the order size sˆi, i.e. Ξ = Ξ
(
M
−
, sˆi
+
)
.43 Market-makers
buy the asset in t = 1 at a bid price of qbid from investors with the high shock
ζA > 1 and sell it to the low-shock types B with ζB = 2 − ζA at an ask price
qask = qbid + Ξ. They earn the spread Ξ, with which they buy consumption
goods on the goods market in t = 1 such that aggregate demand for goods is
not directly affected by the presence of market-makers in the model.
43For the positive relation between order size and bid-ask spreads, see chapters 3 and 6 inO’Hara
(1995), for example. M represents a proxy for the size of the market making sector, which has a
negative impact on the size of the spread as demonstrated in different models in O’Hara (1995). It
also captures the public good character of liquidity as discussed below. Amihud and Mendelson
(1986) provide empirical evidence for the role of bid-ask spreads in asset pricing.
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The transaction cost Ξ is a measure of an asset’s liquidity from the micro-
perspective44 and has a number of interpretations beyond completely exoge-
nous transaction costs as, e.g., in Vayanos (2004) and Favero, Pagano and von
Thadden (2006): It represents the time-varying illiquidity cost of shares in
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) as sˆ varies with the size of the shock.45 It also
captures search costs from search and matching models of financial markets as
developed by, e.g., Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005) because more avail-
able liquidity increases the probability of quickly finding a buyer, but larger or-
ders decrease it. A further interpretation of Ξ are the random order-execution
delays in Weill (2007). They are low in normal times but can become severe in
times of liquidity crises such as October 1987 or September 1998 as described in
section 1.2. These are precisely the times when order sizes tend to be large and
aggregate liquidity tends to be low, at least until a central bank intervention
calms markets.
Adding the transaction cost Ξ to the standard model (24) for idiosyncratic risk
results in
max
s,c1,c2,sˆ,z
E [U(c′1, c2)] =
∫ ∞
−∞
(ζi ln (c1 + ρz) + β ln c2) f(γ)dγ s.t. (27)
p1c1 + p2c2 ≤ w − s+Rs+ (R− q
j)sˆ−Rz −
(
R− q
)
l
p1c1 + q
j sˆ ≤ w − s+ ql
0 ≤ z ≤ s; 0 ≤ l ≤ s; l + z ≤ s
qj =
{
qbid for ζi = ζA
qask = qbid + Ξ(M, sˆ) for ζi = ζB .
In the equilibriumwith ζA > ζB , investors of groupA cannot be buyers of s, i.e.
sˆA ≤ 0, such that their constraints are based on qbid, while investors of group
B cannot be sellers of s, i.e. sˆA ≥ 0, and their constraints include qask.
The spread drives an additional wedge between the assets final payoff R and
the achievable price for sellers, qbid. Hence, costly liquidation (z > 0) is op-
timal for a wider range of parameters and shocks, which in turn leads to an
extension of central bank intervention as the central bank optimally weights
the output costs of intervention against the price increase associated with ad-
ditional money.
Finally, the negative dependence of Ξ on aggregate liquidity M = W − S in-
troduces the public good character of liquidity and financial stability into the
44Other measures of liquidity such as the size of order flows were listed in section 3.6.
45Furthermore,M may be time-varying in a dynamic model in which this three-period game is
played repeatedly.
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model.46 While a decrease in S would lower the expected bid-ask spread and
thus decrease the probability of costly liquidation in t = 1, the individual in-
vestor does not take this external effect into account in t = 0 since she is a price
taker, i.e. dM/ds = 0.
4.3 From small shocks to large impacts: Propagation mecha-
nisms
It may be questionable if transaction costs Ξ can become so large that idiosyn-
cratic shocks can cause financial crises. But modern financial systems exhibit a
number of feedback mechanisms that can amplify small shocks once the price
impact exceeds a certain threshold.47 These propagation mechanisms include
margin calls, capital adequacy ratios, marking to market accounting rules and
modern risk management.
Margins serve as collateral on markets for derivatives and for credit-financed
investments. Combined with some form of a financing constraint, they can
generate negative feedback mechanisms. In Morris and Shin (2004), ‘liquidity
black holes’ arise because of exogenous loss limits for traders. Extending the
market microstructure model of Grossman and Miller (1988), Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2007) use the concepts of market liquidity and funding liquid-
ity: In normal times, capital constrained traders use external funds to smooth
price fluctuations and provide market liquidity. If traders’ outside financiers
cannot distinguish illiquidity shocks from fundamental ones48 and increase the
required margins in response to an increase in price volatility, they can cre-
ate a vicious circle: A negative liquidity shock causes losses and higher mar-
gins for traders, which reduces their ability to provide market liquidity and
thus further increases traders’ losses and required margins. Schnabel and Shin
(2004) use the financial crisis in northern Europe in 1763 as a historic example
of such negative feedback effects. Sauer (2002) adopts their model to explain
the LTCM-crisis in 1998.
Closely related to margin calls for leveraged investors are capital adequacy ra-
tios for banks. Shin (2005b,a) and Illing (2007) show that capital adequacy re-
quirements for banks can set off a vicious circle of asset sales similar to the one
triggered by the funding constraints in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007).49
46Other papers that model liquidity as a public good include Holmström and Tirole (1998),
Huang and Wang (2006) and Illing (2007). For a practitioner’s view, see Geithner (2006).
47In the model of this paper, this may be particularly relevant if idiosyncratic shocks are com-
bined with positive aggregate shocks.
48Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007) borrow this idea from the performance-based arbitrage
argument in Shleifer and Vishny (1997), which is also applied for example in Gromb and Vayanos
(2002).
49In Shin (2005b), financial intermediaries want to maintain a minimum level of leverage. This
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Recent international reform proposals of accounting rules suggest to extend the
use ofmarket prices in accounting of financial firms instead of valuations based
on historical costs. While such marking to market gives a clearer picture of the
true value of firms in general, it may cause excessive price volatility, i.e. volatil-
ity not reflecting fundamentals, and exacerbate or even trigger a financial crisis.
In the model by Shin (2005b,a), marking tomarket is not necessary (Illing, 2007,
p. 10), but accelerates the feedback effects via banks’ balance sheets. Plantin,
Sapra and Shin (2005) describe in a global games setup, how marking to mar-
ket accounting rules can cause large losses in less liquid markets because asset
sales are strategic complements under this accounting regime. They find that
the damage done by marking to market is greatest when claims are long-lived,
illiquid and senior. Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin (2007) combine marking to
market accountingwith regulatory solvency requirements to show that balance
sheet interlinkages among financial institutions and contagion via changes in
asset prices can cause contagious failures of financial institutions as a result of
small shocks.
Financial risk management is a core competence of modern financial institu-
tions and continuously evolving, not least in response to financial crises. In
the 1980’s, portfolio insurance became a popular form of risk management for
investment funds. The discussion of the 1987-crash in section 1.2 highlights
the negative impact of portfolio insurance during the crash. Today, value at
risk (VaR) has become the standard risk measure used by financial institutions.
Banks’ capital requirements in the Basel-I accords have been linked to market
risk based on VaR-calculations since 1998. Yet, VaR is no panacea, either. For
example, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2007) show that a feedback effect can arise
between tighter risk management and a reduction in liquidity. The former re-
duces the amount of liquidity provided to the market and the latter increases
the effective risk of positions because it takes longer to sell them. The heart of
the problem is the endogeneity of risk as described by Danielsson (2001) and
Danielsson and Shin (2003). Financial market risk is not given exogenously
by nature, but depends on the actions of market participants. This property
becomes particularly important if financial institutions follow very similar in-
vestment strategies50 and use the same standardised methods for their risk
management (IMF, 1998).
Stress testing or liquidity-adjusted VaR measures are ways to incorporate liq-
creates a ‘virtuous circle’ of rising asset prices and increased lending. Thus, ‘booms can be un-
derstood as a mirror image of liquidity drains.’ While Shin (2005a) just mentions possible asym-
metries due to default or inefficient liquidations, Illing (2007) extends Shin’s model with a kinked
net supply curve of assets, in this case property, due to information asymmetries. These market
imperfections cause asymmetries between boom and bust periods in asset prices.
50Many proprietary traders of investment banks copied the until then highly profitable strategies
of LTCM in 1998 (see, e.g., Morris and Shin, 1999, p. 52).
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uidity risk into risk management. Nevertheless, the fundamental problem of
financial risk’s endogeneity remains unsolved.51 In particular, individuals ne-
glect the external effect of their decisions on aggregate liquidity. The public
good character of liquidity, however, becomes most relevant during financial
crises.
5 Related theoretical literature
Besides the different propagation mechanisms discussed in the previous sec-
tion, the model developed in this paper is linked to a number of theoretical
contributions in the literature. This section reviews papers that analyse the
Greenspan put option, segmented asset and goods markets as well as market
microstructure theory and papers on the public supply of liquidity.
5.1 Greenspan put option
The ‘Greenspan Put’, i.e. the supposed insurance against severe financial tur-
moil by the Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan, has become a well-known
argument in the popular financial press. To my knowledge, only Miller, Weller
and Zhang (2002) and Illing (2004) have developed an explicit theoretical analy-
sis of the Greenspan put, focusing on the situation in which the central bank
insures against asset price declines caused by a deterioration of the fundamen-
tal value of the asset.
In Miller et al. (2002), the expected present value of all current and future div-
idends determines the fundamental value of shares. Better management of
financial crises by the Fed under Alan Greenspan, as indicated by the exam-
ples of 1987 and 1998 in section 1.2, may have fundamentally reduced the risk
of shares and thus increased their fundamental value. But Miller et al. (2002)
argue that investors additionally hold the erroneous belief that the Fed could
insure them against any fall in asset prices, i.e. not only against price drops
that are due to a financial crisis but also against ‘normal’ declines that are due
to a decrease in current and future dividends. For example, lower productiv-
ity growth than expected may reduce dividends and thus justify and require a
revaluation of shares. Hence, investors appear to have overconfidence in the
ability of the Fed to put a lower bound, a put option, on the share price and this
leads to an overvaluation of shares which represents a bubble. The bubble is,
however, completely independent of actualmonetary policy, which is the focus
of the present paper.
51In Gârleanu and Pedersen (2007), the feedback effects are even stronger for a liquidity-adjusted
VaR than a standard one.
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Illing (2004) uses a model that concentrates on nominal debt and financial in-
termediation. Equity owners have a residual claim on the risky payoff of firms
that are leveraged with nominal bank debt. A severely negative aggregate
shock to the fundamental value of firms limits their ability to repay their debt,
which in turn leads to the threat of bank runs by depositors. The collapse of
banks would extinguish the knowledge capital from relationship lending in
the economy and prompts the central bank to provide liquidity to the banks.
The additional money reduces the real value of firms’ nominal debt, which
represents a capital gain for equity owners. The anticipation of the monetary
injection causes a bubble ex ante, as it raises the firms’ share price above its fun-
damental value. Illing (2004) notes that the central bank in his model faces a
trade-off between the bubble created by moral hazard, i.e. the expected capital
gain, and the risk associated with the disruption of financial intermediation.
The model by Illing (2004) can be easily classified in terms of the framework
provided in this paper, although I focus on financial markets rather than in-
termediation and leverage is not crucial in my model. After the realisation of
the aggregate shock, the central bank in Illing’s model does not face any trade-
off because ex post it is always optimal to prevent bank runs and keep banks’
knowledge capital.52 This is different in my model where the central bank op-
timally chooses between inflation today and an output loss tomorrow after the
shock. The trade-off emphasised by Illing only arises if the central bank has the
possibility to commit to a specific intervention policy in response to a negative
shock. This situation is akin to the optimal commitment solution discussed in
section 3.6 in my model.
Both Miller et al. (2002) and Illing (2004) analyse the central bank insurance
against asset price declines caused by a deterioration of the fundamental value
of the asset, either erroneously expected or actually conducted. This represents
probably a part of the public perception of the alleged ‘Greenspan put’. But the
analysis in mymodel is more closely related to a ‘liquidity provision principle’,
i.e. a temporary deviation of central bank policy from a standard Taylor rule
that responds only to output and inflation in order to inject large quantities
of liquidity in a financial crisis (Taylor, 2005). It is the dramatic increase in µ,
the marginal utility of cash’s liquidity services, that induces investors to partly
liquidate their assets and triggers the central bank’s response, not a change in
the fundamental pay-off of the asset R. Hence, it is the microeconomic view of
liquidity, the missing ability to sell assets quickly and costlessly, that causes a
monetary injection in my model.
52A similar effect occurs in Illing (2007) within a different model with propagation effects as
discussed in section 4.3. There, the central bank always lowers interest rates to prevent fire sales
of assets by distressed banks which have to restore their capital adequacy requirements.
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5.2 Market segmentation
A crucial assumption in the model relates to the limited participation on the
asset market, as workers cannot buy assets. If they could do so and their liq-
uidity needs were not perfectly correlated with investors liquidity shocks, they
might provide the extra liquidity needed to smooth investors liquidity shocks.
The assumption of segmented markets follows the models in Allen and Gale
(1994, 2005) and Huang and Wang (2006), where limited market participation
emerges from participation costs.53 The same impact has the assumption of
separate cash-in-advance constraints on the asset and the goods market for all
agents in Gale (2005). Gale (2005) uses his model to show that liquidity must
be costly in order to guarantee the determinacy of the price level. Furthermore,
the asset price fluctuates without affecting the goods price as the central bank
stabilises the goods prices via its real seigniorage income. Both features are
present in my model as the cash-in-advance constraint never binds (µ = 0) if
the central bank provides liquidity for free, i.e. q = R. Asset price volatility
without spillover effects to the goods market occurs in my model in the in-
termediate range of CIA < γ < LIQ. The main contribution of my paper is
the analysis of financial crises and the focus on emergency liquidity provision
rather than on seigniorage income as in Gale (2005).
In reality, participation in markets is limited because economic agents lack
the required expertise, have limited attention, institutional barriers or other
costs of entry (Gale, 2005). Empirically, Landon-Lane and Occhino (2006) use
Bayesian techniques to estimate the fraction of households participating in fi-
nancial markets to be approximately 22%, while Campbell and Mankiw (1989)
find that about 40% to 50% of the population in the U.S. consume only their
current income rather than smooth their consumption via savings and dissav-
ings. Statistics from the Survey of Consumer Finances 2004 reported in Bucks,
Kennickell and Moore (2006) show that merely 20.7% of U.S. households hold
publicly traded stocks directly and only 48.6% hold them directly or indirectly,
e.g. via retirement accounts.
5.3 Market microstructure theory
The literature on market microstructure analyses the trading mechanism for
financial securities and its impact on short-term asset price behaviour. O’Hara
(1995) provides an excellent summary of the earlier literature, Biais et al. (2005)
survey more recent developments. Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005)
53In Allen and Gale (1994), private agents decide about their participation on the asset mar-
ket before liquidity shocks occur, in Huang and Wang (2006) after the realisation of idiosyncratic
shocks which can thus have aggregate effects. Other papers that use models with limited market
participation include Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (2002) and Williamson (1994), for example.
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review the connection between liquidity as derived from the theoretical and
empirical microstructure literature and asset pricing.
A common feature of this literature is that it does not distinguish between nom-
inal and real assets and payoffs. Technically, most models maximise agents’
expected utility of terminal wealth (see the models in O’Hara, 1995). For ex-
ample, Grossman and Miller (1988) model liquidity as the price of immediacy.
Market makers are willing to smooth temporary order imbalances for an asset
with a risky final payoff if they can expect a positive excess return compared
to the investment in a riskless asset.
An alternative way to model asset trading and possible illiquidity is the search
and matching literature that has been inspired by Duffie et al. (2005). Again,
these models do not differentiate between nominal and real payoffs as an asset
pays one unit of a consumption good per period that serves as numéraire. One
application of the model by Duffie et al. (2005) are endogenous feedback effects
between risk-management and liquidity in Gârleanu and Pedersen (2007) as
discussed in section 4.3.
By providing a framework that links asset price developments caused by liq-
uidity shocks to the real sector of the economy via two spillover effects, this pa-
per makes one of the first steps to link the findings from the market microstruc-
ture literature with the analysis of optimal monetary policy in the macroeco-
nomic literature.
5.4 Public supply of liquidity
Aprominent paper that investigates public provision of liquidity is Holmström
and Tirole (1998), but it differs from the model in this paper in important re-
spects. First, liquidity is defined as the availability of instruments to transfer
wealth across periods rather than to sell assets quickly and costlessly. Fur-
thermore, the paper looks at the production side of the economy as firms may
have a demand for liquidity to refinance their investment projects. Firms fi-
nancing is subject to an agency problem such that firms cannot pledge the full
value of the firm as collateral for credit lines or marketable assets. While this
is not problematic without aggregate uncertainty given the right private in-
stitutions such as banks, private ‘liquidity’ is insufficient in the presence of
aggregate uncertainty. The government can overcome the agency problem and
issue government bonds that are not subject to the agency problem because it
can enforce tax payments. The social optimum in the model can be achieved
with state-contingent government bonds, i.e. an active management of public
liquidity, as their existence averts any private excess liquidity. Hence, Holm-
ström and Tirole (1998) is not a paper about financial crises but rather about
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the involvement of the state in the financial system in normal times.
More generally, however, public provision of liquidity refers to the lender of
last resort activity of a public authority, usually the central bank, as emergency
liquidity assistance to the financial system. Most of the literature on the lender
of last resort concentrates on banks and the interbank market. The collection of
a wide range of papers on the lender of last resort in Goodhart and Illing (2002)
includes only one paper by Kaufman (2002) that discusses the response to fire
sales on asset markets in an informal way. More recent treatments like Freixas,
Parigi and Rochet (2004) also neglect liquidity crises on asset markets, which
are the focus of my paper.54 Given the substantial growth of financial markets
relative to traditional banking in continental Europe and the continuous intro-
duction of new financial instruments like credit derivatives, an appreciation
of the effects of liquidity provision in response to liquidity crises on financial
markets appears to be necessary.
6 Conclusion
The different specifications of the general model in this paper help to provide
guidance for central banks in the event of liquidity crises. Confronted with
a liquidity crisis, the central bank faces a trade-off between injecting liquidity
and thus incurring risks to price stability and negative supply effects in the
future. The size of the optimal intervention increases in the size of the liquidity
shock, the weight on output relative to inflation and the extent of negative
supply effects of the crisis. It decreases in the size of the associated inflation in
goods prices which is linked to the possibility to sterilise the intervention and
the amount of liquidity initially held by investors.
Furthermore, the anticipation of central bank interventions by private investors
leads to a moral hazard effect in the form of less private liquidity provision
and thus an increase in the likelihood of financial crises. At the same time, less
liquidity provision means more productive investment and thus greater aggre-
gate supply in the absence of a financial crisis. Optimal monetary policy under
commitment has to take these additional effects into account.
Motivated by the actual behaviour of the Fed under Alan Greenspan as dis-
cussed in section 1.2 and more extensively in Sauer (2007), the paper has con-
centrated on the optimal monetary policy response to liquidity crises. How-
54One exception is Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2007) who develop a model of financial crises
based on liquidity shortages and Knightian uncertainty aversion in which public and private liq-
uidity serve as complements: The promise by the central bank to provide liquidity in extreme
events, i.e. a ‘double wave of liquidity shocks’ in the model, but not for intermediate events, i.e.
only ‘one wave’ of liquidity shocks, makes private agents provide their own liquidity for interme-
diate events as they are insured against an uncertain second wave of shocks.
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ever, this does not exclude the possibility that other policy tools exist to limit
the probability and the extent of such crises. Regulatory measures represent
an obvious candidate for appropriate ex ante action, in particular in the light
of the external effects of private liquidity provision. A promising proposal
seems to be the introduction of procyclical liquidity requirements for financial
institutions. Such requirements could help to prevent the buildup of excessive
positions in illiquid assets during boom periods via balance sheet feedback ef-
fects converse to the ones described in section 4.3 and at the same time limit
vicious circles during market downturns (see, e.g., Illing, 2007).
Finally, in view of the substantial growth of financial markets relative to tra-
ditional banking in continental Europe and the introduction of new financial
instruments like credit derivatives, the concentration on the banking system
for financial stability as common in the literature appears to be inadequate.
Instead, the understanding of the interlinkages between money, liquidity on
financial markets, financial crises, inflation and real production is very impor-
tant for financial stability and the continuation of successful monetary policy
in the future. This paper has provided one step in that direction. The obvious
next step is to transfer this model into a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium
framework and thus gain additional insights, in particular about the optimal
monetary policy under commitment.
Appendix
A Solution to investors’ problem under aggregate
risk
The Lagrangian for the optimal investment decision problem for an individual
investor under aggregate risk reads as
Λ =
∫ ∞
−∞
{γ ln (c1 + ρz) + β ln c2
− λ [p1c1 + p2c2 − (w − s)−Rs− (R− q)sˆ+Rz]
− µ [p1c1 + qsˆ− (w − s)]}f (γ) dγ.
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Using the Leibniz-Rule d
dx
∫ b
a
f (x, z) dz =
∫ b
a
∂
∂x
f (x, z) dz, i.e. pointwise differ-
entiation, the first-order conditions become
dΛ
dc1
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(
γ
c1 + ρz
− λp1 − µp1
)
f (γ) dγ = 0 (28a)
dΛ
dc2
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(
β
c2
− λp2
)
f (γ) dγ = 0 (28b)
dΛ
dsˆ
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(λ (R− q)− µq) f (γ) dγ = 0 (28c)
dΛ
dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(
γ
c1 + ρz
ρ− λR
)
f (γ) dγ ≤ 0 (28d)
dΛ
dλ
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(−p1c1 − p2c2 + (w − s) +Rs+ (R− q)sˆ+Rz) f (γ) dγ ≥ 0 (28e)
dΛ
dµ
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(−p1c1 − qsˆ+ w − s) f (γ) dγ ≥ 0 (28f)
dΛ
ds
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(λ (R− 1)− µ) f (γ) dγ ≤ 0 (28g)
and dΛ
dz
·
∫∞
−∞ zf (γ) dγ = 0,
dΛ
dλ
·
∫∞
−∞ λf (γ) dγ = 0,
dΛ
dµ
·
∫∞
−∞ µf (γ) dγ = 0 and
dΛ
ds
·
∫∞
−∞ sf (γ) dγ = 0 as complementary slackness conditions.
To derive the expected values of the Lagrangian parameters λ and µ in t = 0, it
is easier to use the optimal values of c1, c2, sˆ, z given a realisation of γ in t = 1
and then to integrate over all possible values of γ afterwards. This is equivalent
to solving for the optimal values of c1, c2, sˆ, z given the partial derivatives of
the integrands in the first-order conditions above.
∂Λ
∂c1
=
γ
c1 + ρz
− λp1 − µp1 = 0 (29a)
∂Λ
∂c2
=
β
c2
− λp2 = 0 (29b)
∂Λ
∂sˆ
= λ (R− q)− µq = 0 (29c)
∂Λ
∂z
=
γ
c1 + ρz
ρ− λR ≤ 0 (29d)
∂Λ
∂λ
= −p1c1 − p2c2 + w + (R− 1) s+ (R− q)sˆ−Rz ≥ 0 (29e)
∂Λ
∂µ
= −p1c1 − qsˆ+ w − s ≥ 0 (29f)
and ∂Λ
∂z
z = 0, ∂Λ
∂λ
λ = 0 and ∂Λ
∂µ
µ = 0 as complementary slackness conditions.
Equations (29a) to (29f) and equation (28g) are equations (9a) to (9g) in section
2.3.1.
The first-order condition for optimal investment in the asset is given by equa-
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tion (28g). Using the results for λ and µ from table 2 produces
dΛ
ds
=
∫ β(W−S)
RS
−∞
[
β + γ
w + (R− 1) s
(R− 1)
]
f (γ) dγ
+
∫ β(W−S)
p1ρS
β(W−S)
RS
[
β (W + (R− 1)S)
RS (w + (R− 1) s)
(R− 1)−
γ (W + (R− 1)S)
(w + (R− 1) s) (W − S)
+ λ
]
f (γ) dγ
+
∫ ∞
β(W−S)
p1ρS
[
p1ρ (β + γ)
R (w + (p1ρ− 1) s)
(R− 1)−
β + γ
w + (p1ρ− 1) s
+ λ
]
f (γ) dγ
= 0.
Solving this usingG (x) ≡
∫ x
−∞ γf (γ) dγ and F (x) ≡
∫ x
−∞ f (γ) dγ withCIA ≡
β(W−S)
RS
and LIQ ≡ β(W−S)
p1ρS
gives
β (R− 1)
w + (R− 1) s
F (CIA) +
(R− 1)
w + (R− 1) s
G (CIA)
+
β (W + (R− 1)S)
S (w + (R− 1) s)
[F (LIQ)− F (CIA)]
−
(W + (R− 1)S)
(w + (R− 1) s) (W − S)
[G (LIQ)−G (CIA)]
+
β (p1ρ− 1)
w + (p1ρ− 1) s
[1− F (LIQ)] +
(p1ρ− 1)
w + (p1ρ− 1) s
[1−G (LIQ)]
= 0.
In equilibrium, all investors follow the same investment strategy and the as-
sumption of a mass 1 of ex-ante identical investors makes s = S. The definition
of conditional expectations
E [γ|γ < x] =
∫ x
−∞ γf (γ) dγ
F (x)
leads to
G (x) =
∫ x
−∞
γf (γ) dγ = F (x)E [γ|γ < x] ,
but this does not allow to solve for swithout explicitly parameterising the den-
sity function of the liquidity shock f (γ). Assuming a uniform distribution for
γ, i.e. F (x) = x−a
b−a for a ≤ x ≤ b, gives the conditional expected value of
E [γ|γ ≤ x] = 12 (x+ a) for 0 < a < b. The definition of the thresholds as
CIA = β(W−S)
RS
and LIQ = β(W−S)
p1ρS
results in the conditional expected values
E [γ|γ < CIA] = 12
(
β(W−S)
RS
+ a
)
andE [γ|γ < LIQ] = 12
(
β(W−S)
p1ρS
+ a
)
. Table
3 in section 2.3.1 summarises this information.
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B Optimal central bank intervention with a quadratic
loss function
In section 3, the loss function (13) of the central bank is linear in the increase
of p1 above the desired price level p∗1 and the deviation of aggregate supply Y
s
2
from Y¯ caused by liquidations Z, ∆(Z). This section shows that the results of
the model are robust to the loss function (30) that is quadratic in inflation and
output deviations from their respective targets, but the first-order condition
and thus the comparative static analysis become more complex:
L2 = (p1 − p
∗
1)
2
+ ω
(
Y s2 − Y¯
)2
. (30)
The optimisation problem (19) for the central bank becomes
min
L
L2 = (p1 − p
∗
1)
2
+ ω
(
Y s2 − Y¯
)2
(31)
=
(
1
1− τρL
− 1
)2
+ ω
(
Y¯ − κ (Z∗ − L)− Y¯
)2
=
(
τρL
1− τρL
)2
+ ωκ2
(
γS − β(W−S)(1−τρL)
ρ
β + γ
− L
)2
.
The first-order condition turns out to be
dL2
dL
=
τ2ρ2L
(1− τρL)
3 + ωκ
2 (Z∗ − L)
(
β (W − S) τ
β + γ
− 1
)
!
= 0 (32)
⇔
τ2ρ2L
(1− τρL)
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct marginal cost of dp1
dL
+ ωκ2 (Z∗ − L)
β (W − S) τ
β + γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect marginal cost of
∂Y s2
∂Z∗
· ∂Z∗
∂p1
· dp1
dL
= ωκ2 (Z∗ − L)︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
marginal benefit of
∂Y s2
∂L
Overall, the quadratic loss function has an impact on the relative size of direct
and indirect marginal costs and benefits, but it does not change the general
structure of the first-order condition. In particular, the direct marginal cost
continues to increase in L, while the indirect marginal cost and the marginal
benefit decrease with L as d (Z∗ − L) /dL < 0 given the assumptions about the
parameters. The optimal L∗ becomes the solution to a fourth-degree polyno-
mial. With a linear loss function, the last two effects are constant, instead, and
L∗ is the solution to the quadratic equation (20).
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